Citation Nr: 0006316 Decision Date: 03/09/00 Archive Date: 03/17/00 DOCKET NO. 94-35 976 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Detroit, Michigan THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Michael A. Holincheck, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had honorable active service from February 1969 to February 1973 and from May 1973 to April 1977. His service from September 1981 to October 1985 was terminated after being convicted at a Special Court Martial of assault with a deadly weapon and being sentenced, in pertinent part, to separation with a Bad Conduct Discharge. He served as a fuel specialist in Thailand from June 1970 to June 1971. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 1992 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Detroit, Michigan. The veteran's case was remanded for additional development in July 1996. It is again before the Board for appellate review. FINDING OF FACT The veteran has several diagnoses of PTSD relating his condition to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION In Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 940 (1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a), the Department of Veterans Affairs has a duty to assist only those claimants who have established well grounded (i.e., plausible) claims. In this case, the veteran has been hospitalized in VA facilities on a number of occasions, dating back to December 1991. The various discharge summaries reflect that he has been diagnosed several times with PTSD related to events in service. The Board find's the discharge summaries to be sufficient to well ground the veteran's claim. ORDER The claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is well grounded. To this extent only, the appeal is granted. REMAND Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition; a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor; and, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1999); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service to support a diagnosis of PTSD will vary depending upon whether the veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy." If the VA determines either that the veteran did not engage in combat lay testimony, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, there must be credible supporting evidence. The credible supporting evidence is not limited to service department records, but can be from any source. See YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 397 (1998) (citations omitted). The veteran's case was remanded in July 1996 in order to allow for development of alleged stressors and an opportunity to submit any claimed stressors to the U. S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (USASCRUR)), for possible verification. Also, the veteran was to be afforded a VA psychiatric examination to determine if he suffered from PTSD based upon a verified stressor. The veteran submitted several statements regarding his claimed stressors. The stressors involved events at his base unit as well as alleged temporary duty assignments in Da Nang and Saigon, South Vietnam. His statements and Air Force records were submitted to the USASCRUR for review. The USASCRUR submitted a reply in November 1997. The reply included an historical extract for the higher headquarters of the veteran's unit. The extract did not directly support any of the veteran's claimed stressors. However, the extract only covered the period from July to September 1970 rather than the veteran's entire period of service in Thailand from June 1970 to June 1971. The USASCRUR response also noted that any verification of periods of temporary duty claimed by the veteran could be done through a review of his official military personnel file. Those records were not obtained. In regard to the veteran's psychiatric examination, he was examined by two psychiatrists in April 1998. The report indicates that the psychiatrists were aware of the required findings relative to their examination. However, the report failed to properly address those findings. Specifically, there was no report from the RO in the claims file regarding whether or not the veteran's stressors were verified prior to the examination. The examiners then provided a diagnosis of PTSD for the veteran despite the fact that no stressor had been verified. They did not provide a verified basis for their diagnosis of PTSD. In light of the failure to attempt to secure all available records, however, a remand is in order. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 270-71 (1998) (claimant is entitled to compliance with Board's remand directives). Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following development: 1. The RO should contact the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) in St. Louis, Missouri, or any other appropriate source, and request a review of the veteran's official military personnel file for copies of military orders relating to temporary duty assignments to Vietnam as well as copies of personnel evaluations pertaining to the period from 1970 to 1973. The veteran's unit morning reports should also be reviewed for evidence supporting the assertion that he was temporarily assigned to Da Nang. 2. After obtaining the foregoing requested information from the veteran, the RO should extract any pertinent information from the personnel records obtained that may tend to support any claimed stressor. The RO should then forward it with copies of his DD 214, AF 7, and any records obtained from the NPRC or other sources, to the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (USASCRUR), 7798 Cissna Road, Springfield, Virginia 22150, in an attempt to verify any claimed stressor. Any information obtained is to be associated with the claims file. The USASCRUR is specifically asked to provide a complete report of actions for the veteran's entire period of service in Thailand, from June 1970 to June 1971. If no further information is available the RO should request USASCRUR to so state in writing. 3. Following completion of the foregoing, the RO should review the claims file to ensure that all of the foregoing development has been completed in full. 4. After undertaking any development deemed appropriate in addition to that specified above, the RO should readjudicate the issue of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post- traumatic stress disorder. 5. If the benefit requested on appeal is not granted to the veteran's satisfaction, the RO should issue a supplemental statement of the case to the veteran and his representative. A reasonable period of time for a response should be afforded. Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board for further appellate review, if in order. By this REMAND, the Board intimates no opinion as to any final outcome warranted. No action is required of the veteran until he is notified by the RO. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). DEREK R. BROWN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1999).