Citation Nr: 0004366 Decision Date: 02/18/00 Archive Date: 02/23/00 DOCKET NO. 97-20 283A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J.M. Daley, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active service from March 1941 to November 1945. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO), located in Chicago, Illinois. In connection with this appeal, the Board remanded has remanded the case twice in an attempt to afford the veteran, who in incarcerated, the opportunity to testify at a hearing before a member of the Board, as he had requested. As there was less than full compliance with instructions in the first remand, the case was remanded again in July 1999. Thereafter, the RO notified him of a Travel Board hearing scheduled in December 1999 and advised him that he would be responsible for making arrangements with the correctional authorities for his attendance at such hearing. The veteran failed to report for the hearing. In a letter to the RO received in August 1999 the veteran, apparently in reference to the July 1999 remand, stated that such informed him that "arrangements can be made with the correctional authorities" for his attendance at a hearing; thus he requested that the VA make the arrangements. However, neither remand stated that the VA would make arrangements; such clearly was the veteran's responsibility. As the veteran failed to report for the hearing, the Board will proceed to decide his claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.704(d) (1999). FINDING OF FACT The existing record contains no competent diagnosis of PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW The veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107(a) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (1999). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Pertinent Regulations "[A] person who submits a claim for benefits under a law administered by the Secretary shall have the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Carbino v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 507 (1997); Anderson v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 542, 545 (1996). A well-grounded claim is "a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation. Such a claim need not be conclusive but only possible to satisfy the initial burden of [section 5107(a)]." Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 79, 81 (1990). In Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992), the Court held that a claim must be accompanied by supportive evidence and that such evidence "must 'justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual' that the claim is plausible." In order to establish service connection for a claimed disability the facts must demonstrate that a disease or injury resulting in current disability was incurred in the active military service or, if pre-existing active service, was aggravated therein. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). Where a veteran served for at least 90 days during a period of war or after December 31, 1946, and certain chronic diseases, such as psychoses, become manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from the date of termination of such service, such diseases shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such diseases during the period of service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1999). Service connection may also be granted for a disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). For a claim to be well grounded, there generally must be (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Anderson, supra; Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1999), a well-grounded claim for service connection for PTSD requires the presence of three elements: medical evidence of a current disability; lay evidence (presumed to be credible for these purposes) of an in-service stressor, which in a PTSD case is the equivalent of in-service incurrence or aggravation; and medical evidence of a nexus between service and the current PTSD. Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353, 357 (1998); see also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). For the purposes of determining whether a claim is well grounded, the Board must presume the truthfulness of the evidence, "except when the evidentiary assertion is inherently incredible or when the fact asserted is beyond the competence of the person making the assertion." King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993). If a claim is not well grounded, the application for service connection must fail, and there is no further duty to assist the veteran in the development of his claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107, Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78 (1990). Factual Background The veteran served in World War II and his military occupational specialty, as reported on his honorable discharge certificate, was heavy truck driver. His service records indicate participation in New Guinea and Northern Solomons battles or campaigns. He is in receipt of decorations and citations to include the American Defense Service Ribbon; the Victory Medal; the American Theater Ribbon; and the Asiatic-Pacific Theater Ribbon with two bronze battle stars. The veteran's service medical records are unavailable and presumed to have been lost in a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) facility located in St. Louis, Missouri. In April 1994, the RO received the veteran's claim for VA compensation benefits based on stress during combat duty. He mentioned a sleeping problem, nightmares and cold sweats. The veteran was incarcerated at that time. The RO requested medical records from the Dixon Correctional Institution where the veteran is incarcerated. Records initially obtained date back to 1993 and reflect treatment for physical ailments without any notation of psychiatric complaints or abnormal findings. The claims file contains a stressor questionnaire completed by the veteran. Information provided by the veteran includes that he served in the Medic Corps, 54th Coast Artillery, and saw and assisted in the treatment of wounded. He indicated that he bagged bodies or transported them to a graves registration unit as temporary duty. He reported that his friend John R. Sims was killed in approximately 1942. He also reported service as a hospital orderly, and stated that as an ambulance and truck driver he was under frequent mortar attacks. He provided the names "Johnson, Smith, Welch, Marshall, etc." as casualties from his unit. The veteran also reported exposure to sniper attacks while serving as convoy personnel with the 888th Port Company. He also provided post-service information, indicating that he had been treated for a nervous condition in 1993 and that the diagnosis was manic depression. Subsequently the RO received copies of additional medical records from the Dixon correctional facility, dated from November 1995 to January 1997. Those records reflect no psychiatric complaints or abnormal findings and no relevant diagnoses. In VA Form 9, received in July 1997, the veteran claimed PTSD "as a result of the racial discrimination...subjected to while serving in the U.S. Army during World War II." Analysis Fundamental to a claim for service-connection is competent evidence establishing that the veteran currently has the claimed disability. In this case, the entire evidentiary record is absent a diagnosis of PTSD or other psychiatric disability by a competent medical professional. The veteran's own belief that he has PTSD (or some other service related psychiatric disorder) is not sufficient to well ground the claim as the record does not reflect that he possesses a recognized degree of medical knowledge that would render his opinions on medical diagnoses or etiology competent. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Absent proof of a present disability, as in this case, there can be no valid claim. See, e.g., Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 144 (1992). The Board recognizes there is some duty to assist a veteran in the completion of an application for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999), even where the claim appears to be not well-grounded, if a veteran has identified the existence of evidence that could plausibly well-ground the claim. See generally, Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459 (1996); and Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995), as modified in this context by Epps v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 341, 344 (1996). The Board also recognizes VA's heightened obligation in cases, such as this, in which service records are presumed to have been or were destroyed while in the possession of the government. O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). However, VA made multiple attempts to locate/obtain the veteran's service medical records; such have been unsuccessful. In any case, those records would not provide the requisite current diagnosis of a psychiatric disability. Although the veteran has reported having been evaluated at Dixon Correctional Center by a Dr. Hughes for psychological problems, the RO made multiple requests for such records and also notified the veteran of such requests. Medical records from Dixon covering a several year period have been received but they reflect no mention of any psychiatric abnormalities and contain no psychiatric diagnoses. No other medical evidence been received showing that the veteran has any psychiatric disorder and he has not identified any other available medical evidence that would support a well-grounded claim. Thus, VA has satisfied its duty to inform the veteran under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a). ORDER Service connection for PTSD is denied. JANE E. SHARP Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals