Citation Nr: 0005999 Decision Date: 03/06/00 Archive Date: 03/14/00 DOCKET NO. 96-29 911 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure. 2. Entitlement to service connection for hypothyroidism, claimed as secondary to the service-connected post-traumatic disorder (PTSD). 3. Entitlement to service connection for a seizure disorder, claimed as secondary to the service-connected PTSD. 4. Entitlement to service connection for hair loss, claimed as secondary to the service-connected PTSD. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Georgia Department of Veterans Service ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. M. Ivey, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served honorably on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from September 1964 to August 1968. He served in Vietnam and his decorations include the Purple Heart Medal, the Presidential Unit Citation, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Vietnam Campaign Medal with 1 device, and the Vietnam Service Medal with one star. This appeal arises before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a December 1994 rating decision of the Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in which service connection was denied for a skin rash, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure, and service connection was also denied for hypothyroidism, a seizure disorder, and hair loss, all claimed as secondary to the service-connected PTSD. The above referenced issues were remanded to the RO in January 1999. The request development has been accomplished and the case has been returned to the Board for further appellate review. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The available medical evidence does not suggest that the veteran's currently manifested skin disorder is etiologically related to his period of active service or to Agent Orange exposure therein. 2. There is competent medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the veteran's current hypothyroidism and the medications he took for his service-connected PTSD. 3. There is no competent medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the veteran's current seizure disorder and the medications he took for his service- connected PTSD nor is there competent medical evidence of a nexus between the veteran's current seizure disorder and service. 4. There is no competent medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the veteran's current hair loss and the medications he took for his service-connected PTSD nor is there competent medical evidence of a nexus between the veteran's current hair loss and service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The claim for service connection for a skin rash, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure, is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (1999). 2. Hypothyroidism is secondary to the service-connected PTSD. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (1999). 3. The claim of service connection for a seizure disorder is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). 4. The claim of service connection for hair loss is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (1999). Service connection may also be granted for disability, which is proximately due to, or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (1999). In addition, the Court has also stated that when it is contended that a service-connected disability caused a new disability, competent medical evidence of a causal relationship between the two disabilities must be submitted to establish a well- grounded claim. Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134 (1994). In addition, service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1999). The veteran has the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that his claim is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). The Court, in Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995), outlined a three prong test which established whether a claim is well grounded. The Court stated that in order for a claim to be well-grounded, there must be competent evidence of a current disability (a medical diagnosis), of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service (lay or medical evidence), and of a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability (medical evidence). The Court has also stated that a claim must be accompanied by supporting evidence; an allegation is not enough. Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609 (1992). A claim is not well grounded where a claimant has not submitted any evidence of symptomatology of a chronic disease within the presumptive period, continuity of symptomatology after service, or other evidence supporting direct service connection. Harvey v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 343 (1992). Alternatively, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has indicated that a claim may be well grounded based on application of the rule for chronicity and continuity of symptomatology, set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). The Court held that the chronicity provision applies where there is evidence, regardless of its date, which shows that an appellant had a chronic condition either in service or during an applicable presumption period and that the appellant still has such condition. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 498. That evidence must be medical, unless it relates to a condition that the Court has indicated may be attested to by lay observation. Id. If the chronicity provision does not apply, a claim may still be well grounded "if the condition is observed during service or any applicable presumption period, continuity of symptomatology is demonstrated thereafter, and competent evidence relates the present condition to that symptomatology." Id. Furthermore, lay assertions of medical causation cannot constitute evidence to render a claim well grounded. Grottveitt v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993). At the outset, the Board notes that the veteran has not been shown to be capable of making medical conclusions, therefore, his statements regarding medical diagnoses and causation are not probative. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). Although the veteran asserts that he has a skin rash secondary to Agent Orange exposure; his hypothyroidism, seizure disorder and hair loss are due to the medications he takes for his service-connected PTSD, these assertions do not make the claim well-grounded if there is no competent medical evidence of record of a nexus between any disabilities in service and/or service-connected disability and his alleged current disabilities. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 489 (1997); Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. at 387 (1995) (lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology does not satisfy the requirement of competent medical evidence showing a nexus between the current condition and service). As such, the Board will review the record to assess whether all three of the criteria of Caluza are met and/or the requirements of Jones are met and the evidence of record supports the veteran's assertions. II. Skin rash claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure If a veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, the following diseases shall be service-connected if the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (1999) are met, even though there is no record of such disease during service, provided further that the rebuttable presumption provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d) (1999) are also satisfied: Chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne; Hodgkin's disease; Multiple myeloma; Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; Porphyria cutanea tarda; Respiratory cancers (cancers of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea), and Soft-tissue sarcoma (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma or mesothelioma). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (1999). Exposure to Agent Orange is presumed for a veteran who served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era and who has a disease listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (1999). 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (1999). The threshold question that must be resolved with regard to each claim is whether the veteran has presented evidence that the claim is well grounded, that is, that each claim is plausible. If he or she has not, the appeal fails as to that claim, and the Board is under no duty to assist him or her in any further development of that claim, since such development would be futile. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991), and Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78 (1990). Evidence Service medical records do not show a diagnosis of or that the veteran was seen for complaints of a skin rash. On his August 1968 separation examination report his skin was normal. In May 1994 the veteran was seen in the VA Medical Center (VAMC) for complaints of blisters and scalp scaling. The diagnosis was possible poison ivy. The veteran was hospitalized in June 1994 at the VAMC in Decatur, Georgia. The diagnoses included a severe rash. However, upon physical examination no active physical illnesses were noticed. In February 1995, the veteran underwent an Agent Orange protocol examination. The veteran reported that spraying of his base perimeter and overhead spraying by fixed-wing aircraft in the area and the trees devoid of leaves consistent with a defoliant terrain in Vietnam near the demilitarized zone. He indicated that he had not had acne or chloracne, but that he had a tendency to pick at his skin. It was apparently some form of a nervous disorder and his rare small scars were evidence of factitia. The report show isolated small scars that appeared to have been facticial dermatosis. Acneform and / or lesions were not found. The examiner indicated that the veteran experienced casual exposure to herbicides in the military for 13 months and that there was no clinical residuum. The diagnoses were history of effluvium, no residuum; examined for acne and / or chloracne, not found on the examination; and facticial scars. The veteran was seen at the VAMC in April 1996 complaining of an itching rash. Upon examination an inflamed rash with drying vesicles were noted on the dorsa of both hands. There was also a smaller area on the fingers. There was no sign of infection or infestation. The assessment was probable eczema or other dermatitis. Analysis Having reviewed the evidence, the Board is of the opinion that a well-grounded claim has not been presented with regard to the claim for service connection for a skin rash, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure. Specifically, service connection is not warranted on either a direct or a presumptive basis for an Agent-Orange-related skin disorder. Because the veteran served in Vietnam during the Vietnam era, exposure to Agent Orange is presumed if the evidence shows that he has one of the diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (1999). However, none of the skin disorders for which the veteran has received post-service treatment (to include facticial scars, possible poison ivy, a rash characterized as questionable eczema or other dermatitis) are contemplated by the presumptive service connection provisions of that section. Thus, presumptive service connection is not warranted for the veteran's currently manifested skin disorders. With regard to service connection on a direct basis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently determined that the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards (Radiation Compensation) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 5, 98 Stat. 2725, 2727-29 (1984) does not preclude a veteran from establishing service connection with proof of actual direct causation. Combee v. Brown, 3 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, in this case, there has been no competent evidence, to include a medical opinion, which establishes the reasonable possibility of an etiological connection between herbicide exposure and the development of a skin disorder. Service medical records do not show treatment for any skin disorders. The veteran's skin was clinically evaluated as normal at the time of his discharge in 1968. Thereafter, the veteran was assessed with facticial scars, possible poison ivy, a rash characterized as questionable eczema or other dermatitis, but there is no evidence suggesting that these skin pathologies were related to the veteran' period of active service or to Agent Orange exposure therein. The February 1995 VA examiner indicated that there was no clinical residuum. There is no competent evidence, to include a medical opinion, which suggests that the veteran's currently manifested skin disorders are the etiological result of in-service exposure to Agent Orange. Consequently, the claim is not well grounded, as there is no evidence of a link, or nexus, between the claimed disability and exposure to Agent Orange during the veteran's period of active service. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995). In addition, the evidence is not indicative of continuity of symptomatology or the manifestation of a skin disease of a chronic nature which would be sufficient to render the veteran's claim as well-grounded under Savage, supra. Thus, the Board finds that the veteran has failed to present a well-grounded claim with regard to the issue of entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, as secondary to Agent Orange exposure. Further, the Board views its discussion above, together with the information provided in the statement of the case and other correspondence from the RO, sufficient to inform the veteran of the elements necessary to complete his application for service connection for a skin disorder. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). III. Hypothyroidism claimed as secondary to PTSD The VA's has fulfilled its duty to assist in the development of the claim under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 136 (1994). The veteran contends that he has hypothyroidism, is due to the medications he took for his service- connected PTSD. The service medical records do not reflect a diagnosis of a thyroid disorder during service. The veteran's pertinent post-service medical records consist of VA outpatient records and an examination. These medical records show that the veteran was first diagnosed as having a thyroid abnormality in 1994. In February 1994 VA discharge instructions show that the veteran was prescribed lithium. During the June 1994 to August 1994 VA hospitalization the veteran was found to have hypothyroidism. There was no indication that this was the direct of approximate result of his post-traumatic stress disorder. VA outpatient treatment records, dated August 1994 to October 1994, show that the veteran was seen for hypothyroidism. In August 1994 the physician indicated that the veteran's hypothyroidism was secondary to lithium toxicity. The diagnostic impression was hypothyroidism. In October 1994 the physician indicated that apparently the veteran was hypothyroid on lithium and that the veteran was currently hypothyroid. His dosage of lithium was reduced. The hospital summary of October 1994 through November 1994 showed that the veteran was noted to have a history of lithium induced hypothyroidism. However, this was noted by history only and there were no substantial or clinical findings to show a causal relationship between hypothyroidism to medication for PTSD. At the February 1995 VA examination the veteran reported that he was treated for a long period of time with lithium and at the same time developed hypothyroidism from the lithium. Upon examination there was no thyroidal enlargement or bruit. The diagnoses included historical hypothyroidism, euthyroid on replacement therapy. The VA outpatient treatment records show that between April 1995 and June 1995 the veteran was seen for hypothyroidism. During the October 1995 to January 1996 VA hospitalization the veteran's diagnoses included hypothyroidism. The physical examination on admission was unremarkable. VA outpatient treatment records show that the veteran was seen for hypothyroidism from May 1996 to November 1996. In August 1996 his thyroid was normal. The assessment was hypothyroidism. In November 1996 the veteran was seen for hypothyroidism. The assessment was to increase levothyroxine to .0225 mg. During the January 1997 to February 1997 VA hospitalization the veteran's diagnoses included hypothyroidism. The physical examination on admission was unremarkable. At his April 1997 follow-up for hypothyroidism the veteran's thyroid was fine. Analysis In sum, the service medical records showed no diagnosis of thyroid disease. The post-service medical records clearly show that the veteran's current hypothyroidism had its onset many years after the veteran's discharge from service. There is medical evidence showing that there is a relationship between service and his currently diagnosed hypothyroidism. In August 1994 the physician indicated that the veteran's hypothyroidism was secondary to lithium toxicity. In October 1994 the physician indicated that apparently the veteran was hypothyroid on lithium and that the veteran was currently hypothyroid. Accordingly, the Board finds that there is competent medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the veteran's current hypothyroidism and the medications he took for his service-connected PTSD. As such, all of the criteria of Jones have been met. Service connection for hypothyroidism is granted. IV. A Seizure Disorder claimed as secondary to PTSD The veteran contends that he has a seizure disorder, which is due to the medications he takes for his service- connected PTSD. The service medical records do not reflect a diagnosis of a seizure disorder during service. At the February 1995 VA examination there were no specific neurologic findings. During the October 1995 to January 1996 VA hospitalization the veteran's diagnoses included a history of seizure disorder. The physical examination on admission was unremarkable. The veteran was referred to the electroencephalogram laboratory in November 1995 to rule out temporal lobe epilepsy versus other seizure disorders. There were no substantial or clinical findings to show a causal relationship between a seizure disorder to medication for PTSD. In April 1996 the veteran reported a seizure disorder to the VA physician. However, a seizure disorder was not diagnosed. In sum, the service medical records showed no diagnosis of a seizure disorder. The post-service medical records do not show a diagnosis of a current seizure disorder. There is no medical evidence showing that there is any relationship whatsoever between service and the veteran's reported seizure disorder. Moreover, there is no evidence that the veteran's reported seizure disorder is attributable to Lithium intake. Accordingly, the Board finds that there is no competent medical evidence establishing a seizure disorder or a causal relationship between the veteran's reported seizure disorder and the medications he took for his service-connected PTSD nor is there competent medical evidence of a nexus between the veteran's reported seizure disorder and service. As such, all of the criteria of Caluza and the criteria of Jones have not been met. As such, the claim for service connection for a seizure disorder is not well grounded. Since the veteran's claim is not well grounded, he cannot invoke the VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 136 (1994). In claims that are not well grounded, the VA does not have a statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing facts pertinent to his claim. However, the VA may be obligated under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991) to advise a claimant of evidence needed to complete his application. This obligation depends upon the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs has advised the claimant of the evidence necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). A review of the correspondence in this case, to include the statement of the case and supplemental statement of the case, shows that the RO fulfilled its obligation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991) as the veteran was fully informed of the reason for the denial of his claim and was advised of what evidence was needed in order to support his claim. V. Hair Loss claimed as secondary to PTSD In this case, the veteran contends that he has hair loss, which is due to the medications he takes for his service- connected PTSD. The service medical records do not reflect that the veteran was seen for or diagnosed with hair loss during service. At the February 1995 VA examination the veteran's hair was florid and somewhat fine. There were no areas of alopecia. The diagnoses included effluvium, no residuum. There were no substantial or clinical findings to show a causal relationship between a hair loss to medication for PTSD. In sum, the service medical records showed no treatment for hair loss. The post-service medical records do not show treatment for hair loss. There is no medical evidence showing that there is any relationship whatsoever between service and the veteran's reported hair loss. Moreover, there is no evidence that the veteran's reported hair loss is attributable to Lithium intake. Accordingly, the Board finds that there is no competent medical evidence establishing a causal relationship between the veteran's reported hair loss and the medications he took for his service-connected PTSD nor is there competent medical evidence of a nexus between the veteran's reported hair loss and service. As such, all of the criteria of Caluza and the criteria of Jones have not been met. As such, the claim for service connection for hair loss is not well grounded. Since the veteran's claim is not well grounded, he cannot invoke the VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 136 (1994). In claims that are not well grounded, the VA does not have a statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing facts pertinent to his claim. However, the VA may be obligated under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991) to advise a claimant of evidence needed to complete his application. This obligation depends upon the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs has advised the claimant of the evidence necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). A review of the correspondence in this case, to include the statement of the case and supplemental statement of the case, shows that the RO fulfilled its obligation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991) as the veteran was fully informed of the reason for the denial of his claim and was advised of what evidence was needed in order to support his claim. ORDER As a well-grounded claim has not been presented, service connection is denied for a skin rash, claimed as secondary to Agent Orange exposure. Service connection for hypothyroidism is granted, subject to the laws and regulations governing the award of monetary benefits. The appeal as to the issue of entitlement to service connection for a seizure disorder as secondary to the service connected PTSD is denied as not well grounded. The appeal as to the issue of entitlement to service connection for hair loss as secondary to the service connected PTSD is denied as not well grounded. C. P. RUSSELL Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals