Citation Nr: 0003489 Decision Date: 02/10/00 Archive Date: 02/15/00 DOCKET NO. 98-06 562A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Seattle, Washington THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for post- traumatic stress disorder. 2. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for bilateral foot rash. 3. Entitlement to service connection for asbestosis, to include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service. 4. Entitlement to service connection for hepatitis, to include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service. 5. Entitlement to service connection for prostatitis, to include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service. 6. Entitlement to service connection for jungle rot/groin rash. 7. Entitlement to service connection for colon polyps. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Stephen Eckerman, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant had active duty from February 1969 to February 1971, and from January 1972 to May 1972. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (hereinafter "the Board") on appeal from a February 1998 rating decision of the Department of Veterans' Affairs (hereinafter "VA") Regional Office in Seattle, Washington (hereinafter "RO"), which inter alia denied the veteran's claims for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bilateral foot rash, asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash, and colon polyps, with the claims for bilateral foot rash, asbestosis, hepatitis and prostatitis include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In an unappealed decision, dated in October 1994, the RO denied the veteran's claims for service connection for PTSD and bilateral foot rash. 2. The evidence received since the RO's October 1994 decision with regard to PTSD and bilateral foot rash, which was not previously considered, is cumulative of other evidence of record, and/or is not probative of the issue at hand, and, in connection with evidence previously assembled, is not so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the veteran's claim. 3. Competent medical evidence showing that the veteran has asbestosis, jungle rot or groin rash has not been presented; competent medical evidence of an etiological relationship or nexus between hepatitis, prostatitis or colon polyps and the veteran's military service has not been presented. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The RO's October 1994 decision, denying claims of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, and bilateral foot rash, became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b) (West 1991). 2. New and material evidence has not been received since the RO's October 1994 decision denying the appellant's claims for PTSD, and bilateral foot rash, and the claims for service connection for PTSD and bilateral foot rash are not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (1999). 3. The claims for service connection for asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash, and colon polyps are not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. New and Material As an initial matter, the Board notes that in an October 1994 decision, the RO denied claims of entitlement to service connection for PTSD and bilateral foot rash. A review of that determination reveals that the RO found that there was no verifiable stressor to support the veteran's diagnosis of PTSD, and that the veteran had failed to submit details of his stressors which would otherwise warrant an attempt to verify the claimed stressors. In addition, the RO determined that there was no competent evidence showing that the veteran currently had a chronic foot rash, or that such rash was related to service. A timely notice of disagreement as to both denials was received in October 1994, and a statement of the case was issued in December 1994. However, a timely substantive appeal was not received, and the RO's October 1994 decision became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b). However, applicable law provides that a claim which is the subject of a prior final decision may nevertheless be reopened upon presentation of new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. In May 1997, the veteran filed an application to reopen his claim for PTSD and bilateral foot rash. In February 1998, the RO apparently determined that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen a claim for service connection for bilateral foot rash. The RO also apparently determined that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen a claim for service connection for PTSD, and denied that claim on the merits. Notwithstanding the RO's denial of the PTSD claim on the merits, the Board will consider whether new and material evidence has been submitted. See Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). After reviewing the record from a longitudinal perspective, the Board finds that no new and material evidence has been received to reopen the veteran's claims for service connection for PTSD, or bilateral foot rash. When a claimant seeks to reopen a claim based upon additional evidence, VA must perform a three-step analysis. Elkins v. West, 12 Vet. App. 209 (1999) (en banc). First, VA must determine whether the evidence is new and material under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), new and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. See also Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Further, when determining whether the claim should be reopened, the credibility of the newly submitted evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510 (1992). If new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the second step of the Elkins analysis requires VA to reopen the claim and determine whether the claim is well grounded pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). Finally, the third step of the Elkins analysis requires VA to evaluate the claim on the merits after ensuring the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) has been fulfilled. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has indicated that in order to reopen a claim, there must be new and material evidence presented or secured since the last determination denying the benefit sought. Elkins v. West, 12 Vet. App. at 213-214. Accordingly, the Board must consider whether new and material evidence has been received since the RO's October 1994 decision. In October 1994, the RO denied the veteran's claim for foot rash after finding that there was no competent evidence showing that the veteran currently had a chronic foot rash that was related to his service. The RO also denied the veteran's PTSD claim, noting his service in Vietnam as a rough terrain forklift driver; the RO determined that the veteran was not shown to have participated in combat, that there was no verifiable stressor to support the veteran's diagnosis of PTSD, and that the veteran had failed to submit details of his stressors which would otherwise warrant an attempt to verify the claimed stressors. The evidence received since the RO's October 1994 decision includes a VA examination report, dated in November 1997, VA outpatient treatment reports, dated between 1995 and 1998, a report the Social Security Administration, dated in October 1998 (showing disability for "anxiety related disorders"), reports from the Deaconess Medical Center (DMC), dated in July 1999, a statement from the veteran, dated in May 1997, and the transcript from the veteran's hearing, held in February 1999. The Board initially notes that with regard to the claim for bilateral foot rash, the pertinent medical evidence includes a VA outpatient treatment report, dated in June 1995, which contains an assessment noting possible dyshidrosis on the soles of the feet. A VA examination report, dated in December 1997, notes two or three small vesicle-type lesions on the longitudinal arch of the left foot. The feet were otherwise clear of any fungal infection, redness, scale or excoriations. The relevant diagnosis was history of jungle rot/fungus to the feet and groin. With regard to the claim for PTSD, the only pertinent medical evidence is the November 1997 VA PTSD examination report, which shows that the veteran was diagnosed with PTSD that was related to combat during service in Vietnam. A. Bilateral Foot Rash The Board finds that the VA outpatient treatment report, dated in June 1995, and the VA examination report, dated in December 1997, were not of record at the time of the Board's October 1994 decision, and are "new" within the meaning of Elkins, supra. However, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been received to reopen a claim for service connection for bilateral foot rash, and that the RO's October 1994 denial of the claim remains final. Of particular note, the veteran was assessed with possible dyshidrosis on the soles of the feet in June 1995, and no fungal infection was found on examination in December 1997. To the extent that the VA examination report contains a diagnosis of jungle rot/fungus to the feet "by history," there were no findings to support such a diagnosis, and the notation in issue appears to be no more than a bare transcription of lay history. See LaShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995); see also McQueen v. West, 96-403 (U.S. Vet. App. Dec. 16, 1999). Furthermore, even if the Board were to assume that a clear diagnosis of foot rash has been shown, nothing in any of the submitted evidence contains competent medical evidence showing that the veteran has foot rash that is related to service. Therefore, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been received to reopen a claim for service connection for bilateral foot rash. As such, the RO's October 1994 denial of the claim remains final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(b). B. PTSD The Board initially finds that although the VA PTSD examination report was not of record at the time of the RO's October 1994 decision, at that time the record contained an "Office of Disability Insurance" examination report, dated in August 1991, which contained competent opinion of record which showed that the veteran had PTSD that is related to his service. The November 1997 VA PTSD examination report is therefore cumulative, and is not "new" within the meaning of Elkins, supra. In this regard, the Board notes as the claims folder lacks credible supporting evidence that the claimed stressors actually occurred, or that the veteran participated in combat, the Board is not required to accept any conclusions as to causation in this opinion. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 77-78 (1994); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993). As unsupported conclusions, these opinions are insufficient to warrant a grant of service connection for PTSD. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 396 (1996) [something more than medical nexus evidence is required to fulfill the requirement for "credible supporting evidence."]; see also Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). Of particular importance, the RO denied the veteran's claim in October 1994 after it determined that there was no verifiable stressor to support the veteran's diagnosis of PTSD, and that the veteran had failed to submit details of his stressors which would otherwise warrant an attempt to verify the claimed stressors. In this regard, a review of the submitted evidence shows that it includes a statement from the veteran, dated in May 1997, and the transcript of his hearing, held in February 1999. This evidence shows that the veteran claimed the following stressors: 1) seeing dead bodies, to include transporting body bags to an Air Force base; 2) a sergeant died in his arms during an attack on a bridge, and; 3) seeing a Latino soldier (possibly named "[redacted]") shoot a black soldier in a barracks. The specific dates, names and places of the stressors involved were not identified, and the transcript of the veteran's hearing shows that he stated that he was unable to provide additional details. The Board notes that the Court has held that it is not an impossible or onerous task for appellants who claim entitlement to service connection for PTSD to supply the names, dates and places of events claimed to support a PTSD stressor. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). In this case, a review of the submitted evidence shows that the veteran has not provided any objective evidence of participation in combat, nor has he provided useful names, dates and/or places, or other useful identifying information, which would allow for verification of his claimed stressors. See M21-1, Part IV, paragraph 11.38(f)(2) (Change 65, October 28, 1998). Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the submitted evidence is not probative of the issue at hand, and, in connection with evidence previously assembled, is not so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the veteran's claim. Accordingly, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been submitted. The claim for PTSD is therefore not reopened. C. Conclusion The only other pertinent evidence received since the RO's October 1994 denial of the claims consists of written and oral testimony from the appellant. A review of his statements shows that the veteran argues that he has bilateral foot rash as a result of exposure to Agent Orange during service in Vietnam, and PTSD as a result of stressors and combat in Vietnam. However, these assertions were of record at the time of the RO's October 1994 decision. The veteran, as a layperson, is not competent to give a medical opinion as to causation or diagnosis. Therefore, as the veteran has not submitted competent medical evidence showing that he has bilateral foot rash, or PTSD, that is related to his service, these statements are not new and material evidence, see Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321 (1999), and are insufficient to reopen the claims. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997); Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211 (1993). Because the appellant has not fulfilled his threshold burden of submitting new and material evidence to reopen his finally disallowed claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is inapplicable. Annoni v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 463, 467 (1993). The Board views its discussion and the statement of the case and supplemental statement of the case provided by the RO as sufficient to inform the veteran of the elements necessary to complete his application to reopen the claims. See Graves v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 522 (1996); Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77-78 (1995). II. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally a continuity of symptoms after service is required for service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Alternatively, the Court has recently indicated that a claim may be well grounded based on application of the rule for chronicity and continuity of symptomatology, set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). The Court held that the chronicity provision applies where there is evidence, regardless of its date, which shows that a veteran had a chronic condition either in service or during an applicable presumption period and that the veteran still has such condition. That evidence must be medical, unless it relates to a condition that the Court has indicated may be attested to by lay observation. If the chronicity provision does not apply, a claim may still be well grounded "if the condition is observed during service or any applicable presumption period, continuity of symptomatology is demonstrated thereafter, and competent evidence relates the present condition to that symptomatology." Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 498. In addition, disease associated with exposure to certain herbicide agents, listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309, will be considered to have been incurred in service under the circumstances outlined in that section even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. If a veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, the following diseases shall be service-connected if the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) are met, even though there is no record of such disease during service, provided further that the rebuttable presumption provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d) are also satisfied: Chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne; Hodgkin's disease; non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy; porphyria cutanea tarda; prostate cancer; multiple myeloma, respiratory cancers (cancers of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea), and soft-tissue sarcoma. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) must have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service, except that chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, and acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy must have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within a year, and respiratory cancers within 30 years, after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards (Radiation Compensation) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 5, 98 Stat. 2725, 2727-29 (1984), does not preclude establishment of service connection with proof of actual direct causation. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). With regard to the claim for asbestosis, the Board notes that in McGinty v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 428, 432 (1993), the Court observed that there has been no specific statutory guidance with regard to claims for service connection for asbestosis and other asbestos-related diseases, nor has the Secretary promulgated any regulations. However, in May 1988, VA issued a circular on asbestos-related diseases that provided some guidelines for considering compensation claims based on exposure to asbestos, entitled Department of Veterans Benefits, Veteran's Administration, DVB Circular 21- 88-8, Asbestos-Related Diseases (May 11, 1988) (DVB Circular). The DVB Circular was rescinded by the Director of the VA Compensation and Pension Service in September 1992, and, at that time its contents were added as paragraph 7.68 of Part VI of the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1 (Manual M21-1). According to Manual M21-1, Part VI, paragraph 7.68, the most common disease related to asbestos exposure is interstitial pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis), and clinical diagnosis of asbestosis requires a history of exposure and radiographic evidence of parenchymal lung disease. In addition, it is stated that asbestos fibers may also produce pleural effusions and fibrosis, pleural plaques, mesotheliomas of pleura and peritoneum, lung cancer, and cancers of the gastrointestinal tract. In paragraph 7.68 it is also noted that cancers of the larynx and pharynx as well as the urogenital system (except the prostate) are also associated with asbestos exposure. However, the threshold question to be answered with respect to any claim for VA benefits is whether the veteran has presented evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that his claim is well-grounded; that is, a claim which is plausible and capable of substantiation. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). To establish that a claim for service connection is well grounded, a veteran must demonstrate a medical diagnosis of a current disability; medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of inservice occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus between an inservice disease or injury and the current disability. Where the determinative issue involves medical causation, competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible is required. See Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d. 1464 (1997). Service medical records show that he received a diagnosis of prostatitis in July 1969. A "dental patient X-ray container and medical history" form, dated in September 1970, shows that the veteran denied ever having been treated for any blood disease, liver disease (to include infectious hepatitis) or lung disease. In October 1970, the veteran was treated for poison oak and heat rash near his groin. He reported that he had had a groin rash for four months. The service medical records include two examination reports, dated in January 1971 and January 1972, respectively, which show that his lungs and chest, anus and rectum, endocrine system, genitourinary system, and skin were clinically evaluated as normal. Chest X-rays were unremarkable. In a report of medical history accompanying the January 1972 report, the veteran denied ever having skin diseases, shortness of breath, intestinal trouble, jaundice or hepatitis, frequent or painful urination, and "tumor, growth, cyst, cancer." The remainder of the service medical records are silent as to complaints, treatment or a diagnosis involving the claimed disabilities. Also of note, service medical records, dated in May 1972, show that the veteran was discharged from his second period of service after he was determined to have schizophrenia which had preexisted service. These records are silent as to any of the claimed disabilities. A VA genitourinary examination report, dated in May 1971 (between the veteran's first and second period of service) shows that the diagnoses included history of prostatitis, "not found at this examination." A VA examination report, dated in June 1971 (between the veteran's first and second period of service) shows that the diagnoses included pruritus ani. A VA "Agent Orange" examination report, dated in July 1994, does not contain any relevant diagnosis. An accompanying chest X-ray report contains an impression of chronic bronchitis pattern. VA outpatient treatment reports, dated between 1995 and 1998, are remarkable for indications of positive hepatitis serology and hepatitis-C, colonic adenomas, and ongoing treatment for asthma. In April 1997, the veteran underwent a colonoscopy for colon polyps. The impression was colonoscopy to upper ascending colon, poor prep, poor visualization. A VA genitourinary examination report, dated in December 1997 shows that the examiner noted that the veteran's liver function tests were normal, and that his chest X-ray was negative. The examiner stated that the veteran's chest X-ray did not confirm the veteran's claim of asbestosis. The examiner further noted that pulmonary function tests (PFT's) revealed mild obstructive deficit with significant improvement after bronchial dilation with reversal, that the veteran's prostate was smooth, nontender and without nodules, whereas a prostate with active prostatitis would be very boggy in appearance and also very tender. The veteran's PSA (prostate-specific antigen) was noted to be 0.5. The veteran's hepatitis-2 profile was noted to be reactive to HCV (hepatitis C virus)-FCR and HCV-CON. The examiner stated that asbestosis, prostatitis and hepatitis-C are not the result of Agent Orange exposure. Reports from the Deaconess Medical Center (DMC), dated in July 1999, indicate that the veteran has "significant chronic obstructive pulmonary disease." A review of the veteran's written statements, and the transcript from his hearing, held in February 1999, shows that he asserts that he has asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash and colon polyps as a result of his service, with the claims for asbestosis, hepatitis and prostatitis to include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service. In particular, with regard to his claim for hepatitis, he argues that he was often forced to work in areas in Vietnam that were covered with human waste. With regard to his claim for asbestosis, he argues that as he served with an engineering unit in Vietnam which performed construction, he often had to work with tar, and he appears to argue that such tar, or other construction materials, contained asbestos. The Board finds that the veteran's claims for service connection for asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash and colon polyps are not well grounded. With regard to the claims for asbestosis, prostatitis, and jungle rot/groin rash, the Board initially notes that although the veteran's service medical records show that he received a diagnosis of prostatitis in July 1969, and that he was treated for heat rash in October 1970, these apparently were acute conditions, as evidenced by the fact that there is no evidence of treatment during his remaining (approximately) one year and seven months (for prostatitis), and four months (for heat rash) of his first period of service, or at anytime during his second period of service, and the fact that prostatitis, and jungle rot/groin rash, were not shown at the time of his separation from either period of service. Furthermore, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, the veteran must submit proof of a presently existing disability resulting from service in order to merit an award of compensation. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 144 (1992). As no medical evidence has been submitted to show that the veteran currently has asbestosis, prostatitis, or jungle rot/groin rash, the Board finds that the claims are not well grounded and must be denied. The Board points out that although exposure to asbestosis is not shown by the record, the Board has assumed such exposure during service, solely for the purpose of determining whether his claim is well grounded. With regard to the claims for hepatitis (on a basis that does not involve Agent Orange exposure), and colon polyps, the Board first notes that the service medical records do not show treatment for either of these disabilities, and that the first evidence medical evidence of record showing either of these disabilities is found in a VA outpatient treatment report containing an assessment of hepatitis-C, dated in July 1995. This is approximately 23 years after separation from service. In addition, the claims file does not contain competent evidence showing that there is a nexus between the veteran's hepatitis, or his colon polyps, and his service. Finally, the claim that the veteran's hepatitis is secondary to exposure to Agent Orange is also not warranted. First, hepatitis is not a disease that is recognized as attributable to Agent Orange under the applicable regulations. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(e). Therefore, as a matter of law, the veteran cannot receive the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that he has hepatitis that was caused by his exposure to Agent Orange. To the extent the law is dispositive of an issue on appeal, the claim lacks legal merit. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 427, 430 (1994). Second, as stated previously, there is no showing that the veteran had hepatitis during his service, and the first post- service record of treatment for hepatitis is found in a July 1995 VA outpatient treatment report. This is approximately 23 years after separation from service. In addition, there is no competent medical evidence in the record showing that the veteran's hepatitis is related to his service. Of particular note, the December 1997 VA examination report shows that the examiner stated that the veteran's hepatitis C was not the result of exposure to Agent Orange. In addition, the Secretary of Veteran's Affairs (Secretary) periodically conducts a review of scientific evidence on the association between exposure to herbicides and diseases suspected on being associated with such exposure. After reviewing a report of the National Academy of Sciences which was issued in February 1999, and other pertinent studies, the Secretary recently issued a notice that states, in part, that a presumption of service connection based on exposure to herbicides used in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era is not warranted for any condition other than those for which the Secretary has specifically determined a presumption of service connection is warranted. See 64 Fed. Reg. 59232- 59243 (1999). Without such a nexus, it is axiomatic that entitlement to service connection cannot be established under Combee, supra. Accordingly, the veteran's claim for hepatitis secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service must be denied as not well grounded. Finally, although the veteran's statements represent evidence of continuity of symptomatology, this evidence is outweighed by the lack of records of treatment for hepatitis between 1972 and (at least) 1995, and the lack of evidence of a rash between October 1970 and June 1971, and June 1971 and the present. In addition, his statements are not competent evidence showing that he currently has asbestosis, prostatitis, or jungle rot/groin rash, or that his hepatitis or colon polyps are related to his service. Under such circumstances, the claims are not well grounded. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). Since the record does not contain competent medical evidence showing that the veteran has prostatitis, asbestosis or jungle rot/groin rash, and as the record does not contain competent medical evidence that establishes a nexus or link between hepatitis, or colon polyps, and an in-service injury or disease, (with the claim for hepatitis to include as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, or some other herbicide, during service), the Board finds that the veteran has not met his "burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claims are well grounded." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for asbestosis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash is denied. In reaching these decisions, the Board has considered the notations of "history of (the claimed conditions)" which appear in the December 1997 VA genitourinary examination report. However, to the extent that it may be argued that these notations are "diagnoses" that are sufficient to render the claims well grounded, the Board notes that the examiner stated that he had not reviewed the veteran's C- file, and that the examiner did not link any of the claimed conditions to service. In addition, except for hepatitis, the examiner's findings do not show that the veteran has any of the claimed conditions, and when read in context, the notations in issue appear to be no more than bare transcriptions of lay history. See LaShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995); see also McQueen v. West, 96-403 (U.S. Vet. App. Dec. 16, 1999). The Board has considered the veteran's assertions to the effect that he has asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash and colon polyps as a result of his service. However, the veteran, as a lay person untrained in the field of medicine, is not competent to offer an opinion as to a diagnosis, or as to the etiology, of the claimed disorders. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Hence, this argument does not provide a factual predicate upon which service connection may be granted. The Board views the above discussion as sufficient to inform the veteran of the elements necessary to submit well-grounded claims for service connection for the claimed disabilities. See Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77-78 (1995). ORDER The application to reopen the claims for service connection for PTSD and a bilateral foot rash is denied. Service connection for asbestosis, hepatitis, prostatitis, jungle rot/groin rash, and colon polyps is denied. R. F. WILLIAMS Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals