Citation Nr: 0002660 Decision Date: 02/03/00 Archive Date: 02/10/00 DOCKET NO. 98-01 843 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Jackson, Mississippi THE ISSUES 1. Eligibility to a permanent and total disability rating for pension purposes. 2. Entitlement to service connection for depression. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder. 4. Entitlement to a compensable rating greater for residuals of a fracture of the right forearm with instability of the right thumb and metacarpal joint with moderate degenerative changes. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD G. Strommen, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from August 1969 to March 1972. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a rating decision rendered in March 1997, in which the Jackson, Mississippi, Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied the veteran's claim of entitlement to a compensable rating for residuals of a fracture of the right forearm with instability of the right thumb and metacarpal joint with moderate degenerative changes. The veteran subsequently perfected an appeal of that decision. A video conference hearing on this claim was held on July 26, 1999, before Jeff Martin, who is a member of the Board and was designated by the chairman to conduct that hearing, pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 7102(b) (West 1991). In a September 1998 Board decision, this case was remanded to the RO for issuance of a statement of the case (SOC) on several issues for which the veteran had submitted a timely notice of disagreement. In November 1998 the RO issued appropriate statements of the case addressing the veteran's claims of entitlement to a permanent and total disability rating for pension purposes and entitlement to service connection for depression, a sleep disorder, skin rashes/lumps, respiratory problems, a cardiovascular disorder, abdominal pain, numbness, genital problems, and weakness, claimed as secondary to exposure to Agent Orange. In December 1998 the veteran submitted a substantive appeal for the denial of entitlement to a permanent and total disability rating for pension purposes. He also submitted a substantive appeal stating that his claims of entitlement to service connection for depression, a cardiovascular disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a skeletal problem of both hands, were not secondary to Agent Orange exposure. This substantive appeal also noted that his only disorder claimed as secondary to Agent Orange was one for subacute peripheral neuropathy. As the record does not contain a timely notice of disagreement or statement of the case with regard to the veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, skeletal problems of both hands, and subacute peripheral neuropathy secondary to exposure to Agent Orange, these claims are not on appeal, nor are they in the appellate process. Therefore, they are referred back to the RO for appropriate adjudicative action. Based on a review of the record, the Board further finds that the veteran has not perfected claims of entitlement to service connection for depression and a cardiovascular disorder secondary to exposure to Agent Orange since he explicitly stated on his VA Form 9 that these disorders were not being related to his alleged Agent Orange exposure. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 (1999). Accordingly, the Board finds that the only issues perfected by the veteran are his claim of entitlement to a permanent and total disability rating for pension purposes and his claims of entitlement to service connection on a direct basis for depression and a cardiovascular disorder. While the November SOC identified all the service connection issues as Agent Orange claims, the Board notes that the RO provided the veteran with the direct service connection regulations and evaluated his claims on this basis as well in the reasons and bases. Therefore, he has been provided with a valid SOC for these issues and they are properly before the Board for appellate consideration. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The record indicates that the veteran's countable income is below the cutoff for income eligibility for pension purposes. 2. There is no medical evidence of record relating the veteran's cardiovascular disorder and depression to his period of active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The veteran's meets the income eligibility requirements for an award of permanent and total disability for pension purposes. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 1502, 1521, 5107 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.262 (1999). 2. The claims of entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder and depression are not well-grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. Entitlement to a permanent and total disability evaluation for pension purposes. The Board notes that the facts are not in dispute as to whether the veteran has a medical disability sufficient to qualify as a permanent and total disability for pension purposes, the record reveals that his non-service-connected cardiovascular disorder is of sufficient severity to render him totally and permanently disabled. The issue at present is whether or not the veteran's income exceeds the minimum income requirements established in the enforcing regulations and laws as a basis for eligibility. Although there was some confusion in the record regarding whether the veteran's estranged wife is a dependent or not, the veteran has asserted that they are estranged and that he does not currently provide any support to her. Accordingly, she is not a dependent. The most recent income information provided by the veteran indicates that his only monthly income consists of $676.00 per month from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which amounts to $8,112.00 annually. Of record is a statement from the SSA confirming that this is his net payment, with a gross payment of $719.80. The difference in the amounts, $43.80, being payment taken to cover his Medicare premium. The RO denied the claim asserting that based on the gross payment of $719.80, his annual income is $8,637.60, over the eligibility limit of $8,637.00. Examining the regulations governing countable income from SSA, this income is treated as either a charitable donation or retirement benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.262(f) (1999). Under this regulation, charitable donations from public or private relief or welfare organizations are not considered income, 38 C.F.R. § 3.262(d), and essentially, that portion of the benefits representing the amount the veteran contributed while working is not income, and 90 percent of the gross retirement benefits count as income after the amount the veteran has contributed has expired. 38 C.F.R. § 3.262(e) (1999). In the veteran's case, either none of his income is countable, as it is a charitable contribution or it is the portion he contributed to SSA while working, or 90 percent of his gross SSA benefits is countable income, this amount being $7,773.84. This amount is below the $8,637.00, as is the net annual income noted by the SSA. Even using the gross income provided by the SSA, the veteran only exceeds the identified income eligibility level by 60 cents. In any case, examining the evidence of record, the Board finds the veteran's countable income is below the statutory limit established as a cutoff for eligibility, and he meets the income requirements for VA pension compensation. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder and depression. The threshold question that must be resolved with regard to a claim is whether the veteran has met his initial obligation of submitting evidence of a well-grounded claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Anderson v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 542, 545 (1996); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995), aff'd. 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). A well-grounded claim is "a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation. Such a claim need not be conclusive but only possible to satisfy the initial burden of [§ 5107(a)]" Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). "The quality and quantity of the evidence required to meet this statutory burden of necessity will depend upon the issue presented by the claim." Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 92-93 (1993). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is "plausible" is generally required. Id. at 93. In order for a claim to be well-grounded, there must be competent evidence of a current disability as provided by a medical diagnosis; incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service as provided by medical or in certain circumstances, lay evidence; and medical evidence of a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1998), aff'd. 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). Alternatively, the nexus between service and the current disability can be satisfied by medical or lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology and medical evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the symptomatology. See Voerth v. West, No. 95-904 (U.S. Vet. App. Oct. 15, 1999); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495 (1997). In addition, combat veterans may use lay testimony as acceptable proof of "in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, if consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such service, notwithstanding the fact that there is no official record of such incurrence or aggravation in such service." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991). However, in the present case, there is no evidence that the veteran's cardiovascular disorder or depression were incurred during combat. A claim of entitlement to service connection for post traumatic stress disorder was addressed in a separate decision from which the veteran has not perfected an appeal. For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that the appellant's claims of entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder and depression are not well grounded. Although the RO did not specifically state that it denied the appellant's claim on the basis that they were not well grounded, the Board concludes that this was not prejudicial to the appellant. See Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet. App 384 (1995) (en banc) (when the Board decision disallowed a claim on the merits where the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) finds the claim to be not well grounded, the appropriate remedy is to affirm, rather than vacate, the Board's decision, on the basis of nonprejudicial error). The Board, therefore, concludes that denying the appeal on these issues because the claims are not well grounded is not prejudicial to the appellant. See Voerth v. West, No. 95-904 (U.S. Vet. App. Oct. 15, 1999); Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). Where a claim is not well grounded it is incomplete and no duty to assist attaches. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991); McKnight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, where a claimant puts the VA on notice of the existence of evidence which would make the claim well grounded, the VA is obliged under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 1991), to advise the claimant of the evidence needed to complete his application. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77-80 (1995). Unlike the situation in Robinette, the appellant has not put the VA on notice of the existence of any specific, particular piece of evidence that, if submitted, might make the claim well grounded. The veteran's service medical records do not include any reference to treatment for, or complaints of, cardiovascular problems or depression. The first post-service complaints of a "nervous condition" occur in a September 1980 application for benefits, and no diagnosis of depression until January 1997, in VA outpatient treatment records, his primary diagnosis being PTSD. None of the medical records in the file relate his diagnosed depression to his period of active service and the veteran has not asserted adequate evidence of continuity of symptomatology to establish a connection back to his discharge. Even assuming continuity of symptomatology, there is no medical evidence relating his alleged symptoms of depression to his current diagnosis of depression. As for his claim of entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder, the first medical evidence of cardiovascular problems of record occurs in 1987, and there is no indication of complaints, treatment or diagnoses of a problem prior to this time. As with the veteran's diagnosed depression, there is also no medical evidence of record relating his current cardiovascular condition to his period of active service. In fact, in a June 1993 statement of record a private physician attributes the severity of the veteran's current heart disability to events occurring on his job after discharge. Given the evidence of record the Board finds that the evidence of record fails to establish a nexus between the veteran's current cardiovascular disorder and depression and his period of active service. To the extent that the veteran contends that such a relationship exists, he is not competent to establish this connection. Medical diagnosis and causation involve questions that are beyond the range of common experience and common knowledge and require the special knowledge and experience of a trained physician. Ruiz v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 352, 356 (1997); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993). Consequently, in the absence of competent nexus evidence, the veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for depression and a cardiovascular disorder are denied. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a cardiovascular disorder and depression is denied. Eligibility for a permanent and total disability evaluation for pension purposes is granted, subject to the laws and regulations governing the disbursement of monetary benefits. REMAND After a review of the record, it is the opinion of the Board that additional development of the evidence should be accomplished prior to further consideration of the veteran's claim of entitlement to a compensable rating for residuals of a fracture of the right forearm with instability of the right thumb and metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joint with moderate degenerative changes. The veteran reports that he has pain in right thumb, wrist and hand. It is established United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) doctrine that, in assigning a disability evaluation, the VA must consider the effects of the disability upon ordinary use, and the functional impairment due to pain, weakened movement, excess fatigability, or incoordination. DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995); Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45 (1999). However, in the present case it does not appear that the RO has considered the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, and 4.59 (1999) which are relevant in evaluating the severity of the disability at issue. The Board also notes that the record is not clear as to whether or not the veteran's neurological symptoms, to include a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome, are related to his service connected residuals of a fracture of the right forearm with instability of the right thumb and metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joint with moderate degenerative changes. Furthermore, it appears that the most recent VA examination given to the veteran was in January 1997. This report does not discuss range of motion in his fingers, provide x-ray evidence of his right hand or wrist, nor discuss the degree to which the veteran's reported pain impacted his ability to move his thumb, hand or wrist, his functional ability or whether the thumb, hand or wrist were stable, weak, or easily fatigued. Hence, it is unclear to what extent, if any, pain has restricted the veteran's motion or the functional ability of the right hand, thumb and wrist, and whether the neurological problems complained of and carpal tunnel are related to his service-connected disability. As a result, the Board finds that this case must be remanded for another examination to include the above noted information. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995); Arnesen v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 432 (1995). On remand, the veteran should be fully informed that his failure to report for his scheduled VA examination will result in his claim being denied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (1999). The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). Additionally, the Board notes that the RO should consider whether separate ratings for the veteran's various residuals of a fracture of the right forearm are warranted to adequately evaluate the veteran's disability. While the Board regrets the delay involved in remanding this case, under the circumstances discussed above, the case is simply not ready for appellate review. To ensure due process, and to ensure that the VA has met its duty to assist the veteran in developing the facts pertinent to his appeal, the case is REMANDED to the RO for the following development: 1. The RO should notify the veteran that if he has any additional lay or medical evidence he wishes to submit to support his claim he may do so, particularly evidence he may have obtained since the last remand in September 1998 and which may not currently be in the claims file. 2. The RO should also attempt to secure copies of all VA outpatient treatment records pertaining to the veteran from the VA medical facility in Jackson, Mississippi, from July 1997, the date of the last such request by the VA. 3. Upon completion of the above actions, the RO should schedule the veteran for a VA examination of his right thumb, hand and wrist. The RO should also inform the veteran of the consequences of failing to report for the scheduled examination. It is very important that the examiner be afforded an opportunity to review the veteran's claims file prior to the examination. The veteran's right thumb, hand and wrist should be examined for degrees of both active and passive range of motion and any limitation of function of the parts affected by limitation of motion of the right hand, thumb and wrist. The examiner should also be asked to note the normal ranges of motion of the right thumb, hand and wrist, were applicable. Additionally, the examiner should be requested to determine whether the veteran's right hand, thumb and wrist exhibit weakened movement, excess fatigability, subluxation, or incoordination attributable to the service-connected disability; and, if feasible, these determinations should be expressed in terms of the degree of additional range of motion lost or favorable or unfavorable ankylosis due to any weakened movement, excess fatigability, subluxation or incoordination. The examiner should also be asked to express an opinion on whether pain could significantly limit functional ability during flare-ups or when the low back is used repeatedly over a period of time, such as an eight-hour workday. This determination should, if feasible, be portrayed in terms of the degree of additional range of motion lost due to pain on use or during flare-ups. Finally, the examiner should render an opinion as to whether the veteran's neurological symptoms, if any, or his carpal tunnel syndrome, are related to his service-connected residuals of a fracture of the right forearm with instability of the right thumb and metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joint with moderate degenerative changes. 4. After the development requested above has been completed to the extent possible, the RO should again review the record and consider all the additional evidence. They should also consider whether the veteran's residuals should be rated as separate disabilities or not. If any benefit sought, for which an appeal has been perfected, remains denied, the veteran and his representative should be furnished a supplemental statement of the case, and given the opportunity to respond thereto with additional argument and/or evidence. Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board, if in order. The Board intimates no opinion as to the ultimate outcome of this case. The veteran need take no action until notified. This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1999) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.44- 8.45 and 38.02-38.03. JEFF MARTIN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals