Citation Nr: 0002184 Decision Date: 01/28/00 Archive Date: 02/02/00 DOCKET NO. 94-07 264 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Baltimore, Maryland THE ISSUES 1. Whether the veteran has submitted new and material evidence to reopen a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including post-traumatic stress disorder. 2. Entitlement to nonservice-connected pension benefits, including on an extra-schedular basis pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(2). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Paralyzed Veterans of America, Inc. WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL The veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Keith W. Allen, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty in the military from March 1968 to August 1969. In February 1993, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Baltimore, Maryland, denied the veteran's petition to reopen a previously denied claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board). In August 1993, he testified at a hearing at the RO in support of his claim. More recently, in February 1995, the RO denied an additional claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits, including on an extra-schedular basis pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(2). The RO confirmed its decision in December 1995 after considering more evidence. The veteran appealed to the Board. He gave testimony concerning both of his claims during a second hearing at the RO in August 1996. For the reasons discussed below, the Board will reopen the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder and REMAND it to the RO for further development and consideration. The Board also will REMAND the claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In March 1991, the RO denied the veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD; later that month, the RO notified him of the decision, and of his procedural and appellate rights, and he did not perfect a timely appeal. 2. Some of the evidence that has been added to the record since the March 1991 RO decision is not duplicative of the evidence that was on file when that decision was made and tends to show that the veteran has a psychiatric disorder of some sort as a result of his service in the military. 3. There also is competent medical and other evidence of record suggesting that the veteran is unemployable, and has been for several years, because of the severity of his psychiatric impairment. 4. The claims for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD, and for nonservice-connected pension benefits, are plausible. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. As new and material evidence has been submitted since the March 1991 RO decision concerning the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD, the requirements to reopen this claim have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5107, 5108, 7105 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156(a), 20.302, 20.1103 (1999). 4. The claims for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD, and for nonservice-connected pension benefits, are well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS When the RO initially denied the veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder in March 1991, it made note of the fact that there was no medical evidence indicating that he had PTSD (i.e., a diagnosis of the condition). Furthermore, records show that his allegation of having PTSD related to his service in Vietnam was the primary focus of his claim for a psychiatric disability, although he also mentioned having experienced chronic depression and problems with abusing drugs and alcohol. Later in March 1991, the RO notified him of its decision, and of his procedural and appellate rights. Although he submitted a timely Notice of Disagreement (NOD) in March 1991-indicating an intent to appeal the decision, and was provided a Statement of the Case (SOC) that same month-he did not thereafter "perfect" an appeal to the Board by the timely submission of a Substantive Appeal (e.g., a VA Form 9) or an equivalent statement. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202, 2.203, 20.300, 20.301, 20.302, 20.303, 20.304, 20.305, 20.306. Thus, the RO's decision became final and binding on him based on the evidence then of record. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.200, 20.302, 20.1103. To reopen this claim-and warrant a de novo review of the record-there must be "new and material" evidence pertaining to the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). In making this determination, the provisions of section 5108 require consideration of all of the evidence submitted or otherwise obtained since March 1991. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App 273, 282-83 (1993); Glynn v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 523, 528-29 (1994). Additionally, the credibility of the evidence added to the record is to be presumed. See Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). There is no requirement, however, that such evidence, when viewed in the context of all of the evidence, both new and old, create a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the case on the merits would be changed. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Although records show the RO included this as a requirement for reopening the claim on all occasions prior to this decision, which, up until recently, was the practice of VA in accordance with the case law of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court)-formerly, the United States Court of Veterans Appeals-the Board will reopen the claim under the revised standard discussed in Hodge and direct further development and consideration of the claim by the RO. Therefore, since the claim is being reopened under the Hodge standard, the veteran is not prejudiced by the Board considering this standard-as it relates to his claim-prior to giving the RO an opportunity to do so. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392-94 (1993). This also negates the need to discuss the arguments that were made by the veteran's representative in a statement recently submitted to the Board, in December 1999, insofar as they pertain to whether the veteran timely appealed the RO's March 1991 decision. In the event that service connection is established for a psychiatric disorder, however, the representative's arguments will be relevant to the selection of an effective date. In considering whether the claim may be reopened, a two-step analysis must be employed. First, the Board must determine whether the evidence submitted to reopen the claim is both new and material. Secondly, if, and only if, the Board determines that the evidence is both new and material, the claim is deemed to have been reopened and it must be evaluated on the basis of all of the evidence of record, both new and old. See Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 145 (1991). The two-step analysis involves two questions: (1) Is the evidence at issue "new," that is, not of record at the time of the last final disallowance, and not merely cumulative or redundant of other evidence of record; and, (2) Is it "material," i.e., is it relevant and probative of the issue at hand, and which, by itself or in connection with the evidence previously assembled, is so significant it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a); Cox v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 95, 98 (1993). Records show that-since the March 1991 RO decision-the veteran has received both inpatient and outpatient treatment on numerous occasions for various psychiatric conditions, including PTSD, schizophrenia, a schizoaffective disorder, depression, dysthymia, a paranoid personality disorder, abuse of drugs and alcohol, etc. Some of the records-and particularly, a June 1999 statement from two of his treating clinicians at the VA VET CENTER in Baltimore, Maryland-not only confirm that he has psychiatric impairment, inclusive of PTSD, and that he has for several years, but they also suggest that it is the result of his service in the military during the Vietnam War, as he alleges. Consequently, since these records contain diagnoses indicating the presence of a current disability and a possible relationship to his service in the military, which was not established when the RO denied his claim in March 1991, they are new and material to his case and sufficient to reopen his claim. See Hickson v. West, 11 Vet. App. 374, 378 (1998); Spalding v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 6, 11 (1996); Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211, 214 (1993). The preliminary determination that must be made upon reopening a claim is whether it is "well grounded," meaning at least "plausible...or capable of substantiation." See Elkins v. West; 12 Vet. App. 209 (1999) (en banc) and Winters v. West, 12 Vet. App. 203 (1999) (en banc), citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). In this case, the evidence cited for reopening the claim for the psychiatric disorder also is sufficient to well ground it. See Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1468 (1997); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995). Furthermore, since the June 1999 statement from the veteran's treating clinicians at the VA VET CENTER in Baltimore, as well as the records obtained from the Social Security Administration (SSA), and those concerning his hospitalization at a VA medical center (VAMC) from November to December 1996, suggest that he is unemployable as a result of the severity of his psychiatric impairment, his claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits also is well grounded. ORDER The petition to reopen the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD, is granted. The veteran has submitted well-grounded claims for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, inclusive of PTSD, and for nonservice-connected pension benefits; his appeal concerning these claims is granted to this extent, subject to the further development and consideration directed below. REMAND The veteran alleges that he has psychiatric impairment of some sort (whether due to PTSD, schizophrenia, a schizoaffective disorder, depression, etc.) that is the result of his service in the military-especially various stressful incidents that purportedly occurred while he was stationed in Vietnam. While testifying during his hearings at the RO, and in various written statements he submitted at other times during the course of his appeal, he claimed that he was subjected to an inordinate amount of mental duress from his superiors, even being abandoned by his commander in a jungle war zone to fend for himself; that, on another occasion, he sustained a concussion during a rocket and mortar attack by enemy forces, requiring that he be hospitalized for treatment of his injury; and that he has survivor guilt as a result of seeing some of his fellow servicemen killed and severely wounded and maimed. Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from a disease contracted or an injury sustained while on active duty in the military, or for aggravation during service of a preexisting condition. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Psychoses-such as schizophrenia-will be presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year after service. This presumption is rebuttable by probative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressors actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressors. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); see also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 137-138 (1997). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service-to support a diagnosis of PTSD-will vary depending upon whether the veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy," as established by recognized military combat citations or other official records. See, e.g., Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). If VA determines the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and his alleged stressor is combat-related, then his lay testimony or statement is accepted as conclusive evidence of the stressor's occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence is required-provided that such testimony is found to be "satisfactory," i.e., credible, and "consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of service." See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). If, however, VA determines either that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy or that he did engage in combat, but that the alleged stressor is not combat related, then his lay testimony, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain service records that corroborate his testimony or statements. See Zarycki, 6 Vet. App. at 98. The evidence in this appeal does not clearly establish that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy while in Vietnam. His service personnel records, including his Department of Defense Form 214 (DD Form 214), confirm that he was stationed in Vietnam and that his primary military occupational specialty (MOS) while there was "cook." Although he contends that he had additional responsibility in Vietnam that involved perimeter guard duty, this is not necessarily indicative of combat service. See VAOPGCPREC 12- 99 (October 18, 1999). Moreover, the evidence indicates that the military decorations he received include the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal, and the Vietnam Campaign Medal, none of which are among those typically recognized by VA as indicative of service in combat, per se. Id.; see 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d). The Board notes, however, that the determination of whether the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy must be based upon consideration of all of the evidence of record. See Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353 (1998). Also, his representative indicated in the December 1999 statement that the claim is not limited exclusively to PTSD, but rather, is meant to encompass all of the various other psychiatric conditions that have been diagnosed (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, depression, etc.). See Buckley v. West, 12 Vet. App. 76, 84-85 (1998). Since the RO's initial decision in March 1991, it has limited the scope of the veteran's claim to his purported entitlement to service connection for PTSD; there has been no subsequent discussion of his possible entitlement to service connection for the various other psychiatric conditions that have been diagnosed. Because there is unresolved ambiguity as to whether the veteran actually engaged in combat against enemy forces in Vietnam, the RO must make such a determination prior to further consideration of his appeal. If he did, and the stressors alleged are consistent with the circumstances of his service in Vietnam, then it is not necessary to corroborate the incidents alleged. If, however, he didn't engage in combat, then the RO must attempt to corroborate the occurrence of the stressful incidents alleged, which usually involves, among other things, contacting the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (Unit Records Center). See Zarycki, 6 Vet. App. at 93 (1995); Doran, 6 Vet. App. at 289; VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1, Part VI, paragraph 7.46. However, prior to undertaking such development, the Board finds that the veteran should be given an opportunity to provide more detailed information concerning his alleged stressful experiences in Vietnam (such as more specific dates of the incidents in question, the places where they occurred, etc.), and to submit any statements from his former service comrades or others who can corroborate the occurrence of such events. If, after obtaining a response from the Unit Records Center, or any other department or agency that is contacted by the RO, either the veteran's participation in combat (to which a claimed stressful event is related), or noncombat-related stressor is corroborated, a VA psychiatrist should be given an opportunity to reexamine him and determine whether his PTSD is a result of any such experiences in service. See Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46 (1996). It is critically important that the psychiatrist who is designated to examine him on remand be given an opportunity to review all of the relevant medical and other evidence on file, including the June 1999 statement from his treating clinicians at the VA VET CENTER in Baltimore, Maryland (and the medical treatise evidence they submitted along with their statement), so the opinion the VA examiner gives is a fully informed one that takes into account his entire medical history and circumstances. See EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 324, 326 (1991); Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 595 (1991); Waddell v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 454, 456 (1993). Some who have examined the veteran have concluded that he does not have PTSD, whereas others have concluded that he does have the condition, in addition to the various other psychiatric disorders alluded to above. While it is not necessary that everyone agree that he has PTSD (or any of the other conditions claimed) to warrant service connection, it is necessary that the diagnosis of PTSD be based on a verified stressor, and this is currently the deficiency in this aspect of his claim. The RO recognized the necessity of verifying the stressors alleged as early as February 1993, when it indicated that-should the claim be reopened (which it has)-then such development would be required to substantiate his allegations. The Board agrees that such development is now warranted. As to the veteran's claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits, the Board notes that total disability will be considered to exist when there is present any impairment of mind or body that is sufficient to render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation. Total disability may/may not be permanent, and total ratings will not be assigned, generally, for temporary exacerbations or acute infectious diseases, except where specifically prescribed by the VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule). 38 C.F.R. § 3.340. Total disability ratings are authorized for any disability- or combination of disabilities-for which the Rating Schedule prescribes a 100 disability evaluation, or, with less disability, if certain criteria are met. Id. Where the schedular rating is less than total, a total disability rating for pension purposes may be assigned when the disabled person is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of his disability(ies)-provided that, if there is only one such disability, it shall be ratable at 60 percent or more, or if there are two or more disabilities, there shall be at least one ratable at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.342, 4.16, 4.17. In exceptional circumstances, where the veteran does not meet the aforementioned percentage requirements, a total rating may be assigned nonetheless-on an extra- schedular basis-upon a showing that he/she is unable to obtain or retain substantially gainful employment. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.321(b)(2), 4.17(b). The veteran's advancing age may be considered in determining whether he/she is permanently and totally disabled (i.e., unemployable) for pension purposes. 38 C.F.R. § 4.19. "Marginal employment," for example, as a self-employed worker or at odd jobs or while employed at less than half of the usual remuneration, shall not be considered substantially gainful employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.17(a). Other factors to be considered in determining whether the veteran is unemployable are his level of education, employment history, and vocational attainment. Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326, 332 (1991). In reaching such a determination in pension cases (unlike compensation cases), VA must consider the severity of all of the veteran's disabilities, as they may adversely affect his ability to work, regardless of whether they are service connected. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.342, 4.17, 4.19; cf. Hatlestad v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 524, 529 (1993). While neither the United States Code (U.S.C.) nor the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) offers a definition of "substantially gainful employment," VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part VI, para. 7.09(a)(7), defines the term as "that which is ordinarily followed by the nondisabled to earn their livelihood with earnings common to the particular occupation in the community where the veteran resides." The veteran alleges that his psychiatric impairment is the most significant reason that he is unemployable due to permanent and total disability-and therefore entitled to nonservice-connected pension benefits. However, the RO has not rated the severity of all of his psychiatric disabilities-only some-and must, prior to further consideration of his claim. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377, 381 (1994); Proscelle v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 629, 632 (1992). All physical disabilities must also be rated. Also, consideration of this claim must be deferred pending completion of the above development concerning his other claim so that he is not prejudiced. See Hoyer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 208, 210 (1991); see also Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180, 183 (1991) (discussing the concept of "inextricably intertwined" claims). Accordingly, these claims are REMANDED to the RO for the following development and consideration: 1. The RO should request the veteran to provide a comprehensive statement containing as much detail and information as possible concerning the specifics (i.e., the who, what, when and where facts) of the stressors that he alleges to have experienced while in the military-but particularly, while stationed in Vietnam during the war. It is essential that his statement includes a full, clear and understandable description of the events in question, and that it contains identifying information concerning any other individuals whom purportedly were involved. The veteran must specify whether any of the individuals that he identifies were wounded or killed in Vietnam, whether he personally witnessed their injuries or death, or learned of their tragedies through other means, and whether any of them have other information that could corroborate his allegations of stressful experiences in Vietnam. When identifying these individuals, the veteran must provide their full names, ranks, and unit designations to the company level. He also must provide any information he has concerning other units that were involved, or any other identifying detail such as the best estimate of the date that the alleged incidents occurred and the type and location of the incidents, etc. He is hereby informed that the Court has held that asking him to provide underlying facts, such as the names of the individuals involved or the dates and the places where the claimed events occurred, does not constitute either an impossible or onerous burden. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). The veteran also is invited to submit statements from former military comrades or others who can corroborate any of his alleged stressful experiences in service. 2. If the veteran submits evidence that corroborates the occurrence of one or more claimed stressful experiences in service, the RO should prepare the report referred to in paragraph 3, and proceed with the development requested in paragraphs 4 and thereafter. Otherwise, the RO should attempt to corroborate the veteran's alleged in-service stressful experiences through all appropriate means, including, but not limited to, contacting the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (Unit Records Center) at 7798 Cissna Road, Suite 101, Springfield, Virginia, 22150. This may require that the RO first obtain morning reports and/or similar types of clarifying evidence from the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), or from similar sources, and that the RO submit this information with any that is provided by the veteran, or others acting on his behalf, for consideration. 3. The RO should prepare a report detailing the nature of any in-service stressful experience(s) determined to be established by the record. This report is then to be added to the claims file. If no in-service stressful experience has been verified, then the RO should so state in its report, skip the development requested in paragraphs 4 and 5, and proceed with paragraph 6. 4. After the above development has been completed, the veteran should be examined by a VA psychiatrist, preferably who has not previously examined him, to determine whether it is at least as likely as not that he has PTSD (or any other psychiatric disorder-schizophrenia, a schizoaffective disorder, depression, dysthymia, etc.) that is the result of his military service, to include in Vietnam. Towards this end, the RO should provide to the examiner the report described in paragraph 3, above, and the examiner must be instructed that only the corroborated stressful experiences referred to therein may be considered for the purpose of determining whether exposure to an in-service stressor has resulted in a current diagnosis of PTSD. If a diagnosis of PTSD is deemed appropriate, then the examiner should explain how the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV are met, to include identification of the specific stressor(s) underlying the diagnosis, and comment upon the link between the current symptomatology and one or more of the in-service stressors found to be established by the RO. Similarly, if a diagnosis of another type of psychiatric illness is deemed appropriate, whether in lieu of or in addition to PTSD, the examiner should explain the basis for the diagnosis, as well as comment upon the relationship, if any, between that diagnosis and the veteran's military service. It also is imperative that the examiner provide a medical opinion concerning the effect of his psychiatric disabilities, individually and collectively, on his ability to work. Since the purpose of the examination is to resolve the question of whether a diagnosis of PTSD or other psychiatric illness is appropriate, to the extent possible, the examiner should set forth his/her findings and opinions in a report demonstrating discussion of the evidence and conclusions in this regard. It also is imperative that he/she review the claims folders, including a copy of this REMAND. The examination report must be typewritten and include all examination findings and the rationale underlying all opinions expressed, citing, if necessary, to specific evidence in the record. The report should be associated with the other evidence on file in the veteran's claims folders. 5. The RO should review the examination report to determine if it is in compliance with the directives of this REMAND. If not, it should be returned, along with the claims file, for immediate corrective action. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.2. 6. Each disability found during the examination should be assigned a rating by the RO; the ratings assigned for the disabilities that can be considered for pension purposes should be combined under the combined rating tables of the Rating Schedule. 38 C.F.R. § 4.25. 7. After completion of the above development (and any additional development deemed warranted by the record), the RO should readjudicate the veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder. The RO should not limit its analysis and discussion to PTSD-but rather, should also consider his possible entitlement to service connection for the various other psychiatric conditions that have been diagnosed (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, depression, etc.). In adjudicating this claim, the RO should specifically consider it in light of both the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV criteria, and apply the more favorable criteria. See Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 312-13 (1991). As to his claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits, if the veteran does not have a singular or combined 100 percent evaluation, or a disability which, by its nature, is deemed to render him totally disabled, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.15, the RO should adjudicate the issue of whether a total rating is assignable based upon consideration of "objective" ("average person") and "subjective" factors, as outlined above. See Talley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 282 (1992); Brown v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 444 (1992). Such adjudication must specifically include consideration of whether he is entitled to a total rating on an extra-schedular basis, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(2). The RO must base both of its decisions on consideration of all of the pertinent evidence of record, including that added to the record since the issuance of the last Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC)-of note, the June 1999 statement from the veteran's treating clinicians at the VA VET CENTER in Baltimore, Maryland. The RO also must base its decision on all pertinent legal authority. The SSOC should include the rating criteria for each disorder of the veteran which is found. 8. If the benefits sought by the veteran continue to be denied, then he and his representative should be furnished a SSOC and given an opportunity to submit written or other argument in response thereto before the case is returned to the Board for further appellate consideration. The purpose of this REMAND is to afford due process and to further develop the record; it is not the Board's intent to imply whether the benefits requested should be granted or denied. The veteran need take no action until otherwise notified, but he may furnish additional evidence and/or argument during the appropriate time frame. See Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999); Colon v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 104, 108 (1996); Booth v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 109 (1995); Quarles v Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 129, 141 (1992). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1999) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.44- 8.45 and 38.02-38.03. BARBARA B. COPELAND Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals The Unit Records Center was formerly known as the United States Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group (ESG). Now included in Manual M21-1 in Part IV, Paragraph 11.38(f) (Change 61, September 12, 1997) and in Part III, Paragraph 5.14(b) (Change 49, February 20, 1996).