Citation Nr: 0007174 Decision Date: 03/16/00 Archive Date: 03/23/00 DOCKET NO. 98-08 518A ) DATE ) ) THE ISSUE Whether there was clear and unmistakable error in the February 23, 1998, Board decision, which denied a claim of entitlement to service connection for asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, claimed as residuals of asbestos exposure. REPRESENTATION Moving Party Represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. L. Smith, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran, the moving party herein, had active service from August 1948 to February 1950, and from September 1950 to January 1957. This matter comes before the Board from a June 1998 motion from the moving party for revision or reversal on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) of a February 23, 1998 Board decision that denied service connection for asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a February 23, 1998, decision the Board denied entitlement to service connection for asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, finding that the preponderance of the evidence was against the claim. 2. The moving party has alleged that service connection should have been granted as the evidence supported the claim; and specifically, that the evidence did show that the veteran's asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease were caused by his exposure to asbestos in service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The moving party's allegation of clear and unmistakable error in the February 23, 1998, Board decision in failing to grant a claim for entitlement to service connection for asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease fails to meet the threshold pleading requirements for revision of the Board decision on grounds of clear and unmistakable error. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West Supp. 1999); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1403, 1404 (1999). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION On February 23, 1998, the Board issued a decision that denied the veteran's (moving party's) claim of entitlement to service connection for asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. In June 1998, the moving party filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 1998 Board decision which was subsequently denied in September 1998. However, the moving party was also informed at that time that his correspondence would also be considered as a request for revision of the February 1998 Board decision on the grounds of CUE. In March 1999, the Board notified the moving party that it would not consider his motion for reconsideration as a motion for CUE unless he affirmatively replied within 60 days. A response was received from the moving party in April 1999, confirming his intent to have his earlier correspondence considered as a CUE motion. Thereafter, the Board forwarded a copy of the moving party's CUE motion to his representative and provided an opportunity to file a response. After review of the claims folder, the representative submitted a written brief, dated November 1999, in support of the moving party's motion for revision of the Board's decision of February 23, 1998. Motions for review of prior Board decisions on the grounds of CUE are adjudicated pursuant to the Board's Rules of Practice at 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400- 1411 (1999). Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b), the motion alleging CUE in a prior Board decision must set forth clearly and specifically the alleged CUE, or errors of fact or law in the Board decision, the legal or factual basis for such allegations, and why the result would have been different but for the alleged error. Non-specific allegations of failure to follow regulations or failure to give due process, or any other general, non- specific allegations of error, are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the previous sentence. Motions that fail to comply with the requirements set forth in this paragraph shall be denied. The Board notes that it has original jurisdiction to determine whether CUE exists in a prior final Board decision. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403, relates to what constitutes CUE and what does not, and provides as follows: (a) General. Clear and unmistakable error is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of error, of fact or of law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. (b) Record to be reviewed.--(1) General. Review for clear and unmistakable error in a prior Board decision must be based on the record and the law that existed when that decision was made. (2) Special rule for Board decisions issued on or after July 21, 1992. For a Board decision issued on or after July 21, 1992, the record that existed when that decision was made includes relevant documents possessed by the Department of Veterans Affairs not later than 90 days before such record was transferred to the Board for review in reaching that decision, provided that the documents could reasonably be expected to be part of the record. (c) Errors that constitute clear and unmistakable error. To warrant revision of a Board decision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error, there must have been an error in the Board's adjudication of the appeal which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome when it was made. If it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be clear and unmistakable. (d) Examples of situations that are not clear and unmistakable error. - (1) Changed diagnosis. A new medical diagnosis that "corrects" an earlier diagnosis considered in a Board decision. (2) Duty to assist. The Secretary's failure to fulfill the duty to assist. (3) Evaluation of evidence. A disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. (e) Change in interpretation. Clear and unmistakable error does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision challenged, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. (Authority: 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 501(a), 7111). The Board points out that a review for CUE in a prior Board decision must be based on the record and the law that existed when that decision was made. In this case, the moving party has not demonstrated that the Board's February 1998 decision contains CUE. That determination found that there was no objective evidence which indicated that the veteran was exposed to asbestos during his active military service, and that there was no medical evidence which indicated that the veteran's current pulmonary disorders, to include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asbestosis, were caused by inservice asbestos exposure. Thus, the Board held that the preponderance of the evidence was against the claim for service connection for residuals of asbestos exposure, to include asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; and therefore, the claim was denied. In his June 1998 motion and supplemental argument provided by his representative, the moving party essentially argued that the Board erred in that the evidence of record did establish that the veteran's asbestosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease were due to his exposure to asbestos in service. In additional argument submitted by the representative in November 1999, it is argued that "[I]n our opinion, the Board neglected the fact, that the physician stated a history of asbestos exposure ..." (Emphasis added). In essence, the representative argued that the Board misinterpreted a 1986 medical report, in light of the additional evidence of record. Such allegations do not constitute a valid claim of CUE. As stated by the Court, for CUE to exist: (1) "[e]ither the correct facts, as they were known at that time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated), or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied," (2) the error must be "undebatable" and the sort "which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made," and (3) a determination that there was CUE must be based on the record and law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in question. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994) (quoting Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992)). The Board must emphasize that the Court has consistently stressed the rigorous nature of the concept of CUE. "Clear and unmistakable error is an administrative failure to apply the correct statutory and regulatory provisions to the correct and relevant facts; it is not mere misinterpretation of facts." Oppenheimer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 370, 372 (1991). CUE "are errors that are undebatable, so that it can be said that reasonable minds could only conclude that the original decision was fatally flawed at the time it was made." Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313. "It must always be remembered that [clear and unmistakable error] is a very specific and rare kind of 'error.'" Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993). A disagreement with how the Board evaluated the facts is inadequate to raise the claim of clear and unmistakable error. Luallen v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 92, 95 (1995). In this respect, the moving party has raised a generic allegation of error concerning the February 1998 Board decision, but not necessarily the discrete issue of CUE. The moving party and his representative have alleged that the February 23 1998 decision was the product of error essentially because the Board failed to conclude that the evidence demonstrated a causal relationship between the veteran's diagnosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asbestosis and his prior active duty. This argument represents a clear-cut example of disagreement as to how the evidence was interpreted and evaluated, and as such cannot constitute a basis for a finding of CUE. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d)(3); see also Luallen, supra. Thus, after careful review of the evidence of record, the undersigned concludes that the moving party has not set forth specific allegations of error either of fact or law, in the February 23, 1998, decision by the Board. Accordingly, in the absence of any additional allegations, the motion is denied. ORDER The motion for revision of the February 23, 1998, Board decision on the grounds of CUE is denied. M. G. MAZZUCCHELLI Acting Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals