Citation Nr: 0007885 Decision Date: 03/23/00 Archive Date: 03/28/00 DOCKET NO. 98-11 956A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Houston, Texas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for thrombophlebitis. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a chronic back disorder. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a chronic neurological disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Texas Veterans Commission ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Stephen F. Sylvester, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from December 1945 to October 1947, and from July 1948 to May 1952. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The claim for service connection for thrombophlebitis is not supported by cognizable evidence showing that this disability was present in service, or is otherwise of service origin. 2. The claim for service connection for a chronic back disorder is not supported by cognizable evidence showing that this disability was present in service, or is otherwise of service origin. 3. The claim for service connection for a chronic neurological disorder is not supported by cognizable evidence showing that this disability was present in service, or is otherwise of service origin. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The claim for service connection for thrombophlebitis is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b)(1999). 2. The claim for service connection for a chronic back disorder is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). 3. The claim for service connection for a chronic neurological disorder is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS As to those issues currently before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board), the threshold question which must be resolved is whether the veteran's claims are well grounded. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). A well-grounded claim is a plausible claim, meaning a claim which appears to be meritorious. See Murphy, 1 Vet. App. 81. A mere allegation that a disability is service connected is not sufficient; the veteran must submit evidence in support of his claims which would "justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claims are plausible." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992). In order for a claim to be well grounded, there must be competent evidence of current disability (medical diagnosis), of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service (lay or medical evidence), and of a nexus between the inservice injury or disease and the current disability (medical evidence). See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995); see also Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 379 (1995); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91 (1993). The second and third elements of this equation may also be satisfied under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (1998) by (a) evidence that a condition was "noted" during service or during an applicable presumptive period; (b) evidence showing post service continuity of symptomatology; and (c) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post service symptomatology. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (1998); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). Alternatively, service connection may be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) by evidence of (i) the existence of a chronic disease in service or during an applicable presumptive period and (ii) present manifestations of the same chronic disease. Ibid. For the purpose of determining whether a claim is well grounded, the credibility of the evidence in support of the claim is presumed. See Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). Moreover, where a veteran served continuously for ninety (90) days or more during a period of war, or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and arthritis becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1998). In the present case, service medical records are negative for history, complaints, or abnormal findings indicative of the presence of chronic back or neurological disabilities. While in December 1951, the veteran received treatment for what was at that time described as "chronic" thrombotic phlebitis, as of the time of the veteran's service separation examination in May 1952, his heart and/or vascular system was within normal limits, as were his spine and musculoskeletal system, and his nervous system. The Board observes that, at the time of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) general medical examination in July 1952, there was no evidence of thrombophlebitis, or of chronic disorders of the veteran's back or nervous system. The earliest clinical indication of the potential presence of a back disorder of any kind is revealed by private medical records dated in March 1993, more than 40 years following the veteran's discharge from service, at which time there was noted the presence of "vertebral malalignment in the cervical and lumbar spine," accompanied by "possible arthritis." Sensory polyneuropathy of the lower extremities, to the extent that it might be considered a "neurological disorder," was first shown no earlier than January 1996, almost 24 years following the veteran's service separation. The Board notes that, on VA vascular examination in January 1996, the veteran showed "no evidence" of thrombophlebitis, or of other complications of his (service-connected) varicose veins. Notwithstanding the current evidence of arthritis or polyneuropathy, the only evidence which the veteran has submitted which supports a finding of a nexus to service for these disabilities is his own statements. Evidence of such a nexus, however, cannot be provided by lay statements, because "lay persons are not competent to offer medical opinions." Grottveit, supra; see also Meyer v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 425 (1996); Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 384 (1995); Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 136 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Based upon a full review of the pertinent evidence of record, the Board is unable to conclude that the veteran currently suffers from chronic thrombophlebitis. Moreover, it has yet to be demonstrated that the veteran's current arthritis of the spine or polyneuropathy of the lower extremities was present in service, or is otherwise of service origin. Under such circumstances, the veteran's claims are not well grounded, and must be denied. ORDER Service connection for thrombophlebitis is denied. Service connection for a chronic back disorder is denied. Service connection for a chronic neurological disorder is denied. John E. Ormond, Jr. Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals