Citation Nr: 0007622 Decision Date: 03/21/00 Archive Date: 03/28/00 DOCKET NO. 94-14 140 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical and Regional Office Center in Wichita, Kansas THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Milo H. Hawley, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had honorable, active service from April 1961 to April 1964. By administrative decision in May 1972 it was determined that the veteran's period of service from March 1971 to March 1972 ended with his discharge under dishonorable conditions so as to preclude entitlement to veterans' benefits for this period of service, other than health care benefits under Chapter 17 of the United States Code. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 1993 decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Los Angeles, California. A June 1996 RO decision denied service connection for tinnitus. A statement from the veteran's representative was accepted as a notice of disagreement and a statement of the case was issued in July 1997. A substantive appeal has not been filed. Therefore, the issue of entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is not in appellate status. FINDING OF FACT The claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not plausible. CONCLUSION OF LAW The claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION As noted above an administrative decision in May 1972 determined that the veteran's period of service from March 1971 to March 1972 ended with his discharge under dishonorable conditions so as to preclude entitlement to veterans' benefits for this period of service, other than health care benefits under Chapter 17 of the United States Code. The record reflects that the veteran was notified that this period of service was under dishonorable conditions by official letter in December 1977. This letter informed the veteran of his appellate rights, but he did not initiate an appeal, and the decision became final. In the Board's July 1996 remand the veteran's substantive appeal, herein, was construed as raising the issue of the character of the veteran's discharge for the period of service from March 1971 to March 1972. The issue of whether new and material evidence had been received to reopen a claim of whether the character of the veteran's discharge in March 1972 was under dishonorable conditions was referred to the RO. The veteran was requested to provide any information he had concerning review of his March 1972 discharge by the Army Discharge Review Board and to authorize the release of any additional documents. He signed a release for documents. A May 1997 response to VA's inquiry regarding additional documents reflects that the inquiry had been referred. The RO then made inquiry of the National Personnel Records Center, with a March 1999 response indicating that the information or documents requested were not on file. In January 1997 the veteran submitted a change of address. In August 1999 an administrative decision found that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen a claim with respect to the character of the veteran's discharge from the period of service ending in March 1972. A copy of that decision was mailed to the address provided by the veteran in January 1997, but it was returned to sender. A second attempt was made to mail a copy of that decision to the veteran at a different address, but it was again returned to sender as unclaimed. On the basis of the record, as set forth above, the veteran's discharge from the period of service from March 1971 to March 1972 has been determined to be under dishonorable conditions so as to preclude entitlement to veterans' benefits for this period of service, other than health care benefits under Chapter 17 of the United States Code. Therefore, service connection for PTSD based upon this period of service is precluded by law. In Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994), it was held that cases such as this, in which the law is dispositive, should be denied because of the absence of legal merit. Accordingly, service connection for PTSD may not be granted on the basis of the second period of the veteran's service. The threshold question, with respect to the first period of service, is whether the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is well grounded under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). A well-grounded service connection claim for PTSD has been submitted where there is "[1] medical evidence of a current [PTSD] disability; [2] lay evidence (presumed to be credible for these purposes) of an inservice stressor, which in a PTSD case is the equivalent of inservice incurrence or aggravation; and [3] medical evidence of a nexus between service and the current PTSD disability." Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 137 (1997). The veteran's second period of service from March 1971 to March 1972 has been addressed above. His service personnel records, relating to his active service from April 1961 to April 1964, do not indicate that the veteran served in Vietnam during any of this service, and it is not so contended. The veteran has indicated that he has received treatment at multiple VA facilities and records from these facilities have been requested and received. These records indicate that the veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD. However, there is no competent medical evidence of record that associates his diagnosis of PTSD with his period of active service from April 1961 to April 1964. Rather, his PTSD has been associated with his service in Vietnam, that occurred during his service from March 1971 to March 1972, as well as with events that occurred during his childhood. For purposes of determining whether or not the veteran's claim is well grounded his statements are presumed credible, but he is not qualified, as a lay person, to establish a medical diagnosis or show a medical etiology merely by his own assertions, as such matters require medical expertise. See Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992). In order for the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD to be well grounded, he must submit medical evidence that he currently has PTSD and that it is related to honorable, active service. There is no competent medical evidence providing a nexus between the veteran's diagnosed PTSD and his active service from April 1961 to April 1964. The Board therefore concludes that without the requisite competent medical evidence providing a medical nexus between the diagnosed PTSD and honorable, active service, the claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not well grounded. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995); Cohen. The Board views its discussion as sufficient to inform the veteran of the elements necessary to complete his claim for disability compensation for the above discussed disability. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995). ORDER Evidence of a well grounded claim for service connection for PTSD not having been submitted, the appeal is denied. ROBERT E. SULLIVAN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals