Citation Nr: 0002331 Decision Date: 01/28/00 Archive Date: 02/02/00 DOCKET NO. 96-43 713 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Hartford, Connecticut THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Connecticut Department of Veterans Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Jonathan E. Taylor, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant served on active duty from September 1967 to September 1969. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (the Board) on appeal from a June 1996 rating decision of the Hartford, Connecticut, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). This case was before the Board previously in September 1998 when it was remanded for additional development, including verifying whether the appellant engaged in combat with the enemy during service. The requested development has been completed, to the extent possible, and the case has been returned to the Board for further appellate review. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The appellant's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is plausible, and the RO has obtained sufficient evidence for correct resolution of this claim. 2. The appellant is not a veteran of combat. 3. There is no corroboration or verification of the occurrence of the appellant's claimed stressors. 4. The appellant has presented no medical evidence of a nexus between residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg any disease or injury in his active military service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The appellant has presented a well-grounded claim for service connection for PTSD, and VA has satisfied its statutory duty to assist him in developing facts pertinent to this claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1999). 2. The appellant's PTSD was not incurred during service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1154 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(d), 3.304(f) (1999). 3. The claim of service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg is not well grounded, and there is no further statutory duty to assist the appellant in developing facts pertinent to that claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Factual Background The appellant contends that he has PTSD resulting from stressors he experienced during his service in Vietnam. Service personnel records reveal that the appellant was with the Headquarters Company [HqCo], 9th Engineer Battalion [Engr.Bn.], Battalion [Bn.], FMF, FPO, SF, from April 17, 1968 and with the Headquarters Company [HqCo], 7th Marines [Mar], 1st Marine Division [Mar.Div.] from July 29, 1968. Both of these units were in Vietnam on the dates listed above. The appellant's military occupational specialty (MOS) was engineer equipment operator. The appellant's service personnel records do not contain any listing under the heading "Combat History-Expeditions." The appellant was awarded the National Defense Service Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Gallantry Cross with Palm, a Good Conduct Medal, a Vietnam Service Medal, and a Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal. The appellant also contends that while serving in Vietnam, he sustained shrapnel wounds to the left leg while helping a buddy who had been hit. Service medical records, although showing medical treatment for various problems during the appellant's tour of duty in Vietnam, show no complaints of or treatment for shrapnel wounds. His August 1969 separation examination noted no injuries or scars on the left leg. In a May 1995 statement, the appellant stated that while in Vietnam, he served as a combat engineer with the 9th Engineer Battalion. He stated that he dealt with C-4 explosives and had to blow up enemy tunnels and fortifications. He stated that he had seen many Marines "ripped apart." He stated that he was body parts "all over the place." He stated that he served also in Vietnam with the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. He explained that he was stationed near Da Nang on "Hill 55." He stated that a location near the hill was nicknamed "Dodge City." He stated that he was involved frequently in "shootouts" with the enemy. He added that his brother was stationed nearby. He stated that he "made a point" to see his brother. In a July 1995 statement, the appellant provided his brother's date of birth, and stated that his brother served in Vietnam with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The appellant stated that his brother had been wounded at "Dodge City." The appellant stated that he "encountered many a bad time" at "Dodge City" himself. He recalled that many enemy soldiers were "out there." He explained that he did not recall any specific dates but that he had these experiences in "late 1967 and 1968." In July 1995 the appellant submitted to the RO two newspaper clipping. The clipping from the May 21, 1968 edition of the New Britain Herald indicates that a Marine Private First Class [Pfc.], from Plainville, Connecticut, with the appellant's name was helping to clear mine fields and enemy fortifications, while serving with the First Marine Division near Da Nang, South Vietnam. The other clipping, which is undated and does not identify the newspaper, indicates that a Marine Lance Corporal, of Plainville, Connecticut, with the appellant's name was in Vietnam as a member of the First Marine Division. During a VA hospitalization from August to September 1995, the appellant was diagnosed with PTSD. The appellant reported that, while he was in Vietnam, he experienced a number of traumatic events: the death of close friends, a continual stream of body parts, and fragging a mother and child. On VA psychiatric examination in September 1995, the appellant reported that he served in Vietnam and was in frontline positions, underwent heavy rocket and mortar fire, and was in constant fear of being ambushed. He stated that he was assigned as an engineer to blow up tunnels. He indicated that he was wounded by shrapnel in his legs, but the wounds were not serious and he did not seek medical treatment. He also claimed that he saw many men killed in enemy fire. PTSD, severe, was diagnosed. On VA examination in September 1995, the appellant related that his shrapnel wounds in service were not serious, that he removed the shrapnel himself, and that he continued fighting. Examination of the left leg revealed a two-inch healed scar in the midline above the ankle, a one-inch scar lateral to the shin, and several peppered scars on the shin. The diagnosis was superficial shrapnel wounds to the skin above the left ankle and the left shin. The RO contacted the Department of the Navy in an attempt to verify the appellant's reported stressors. The response was that the appellant had submitted insufficient information for the purpose of conducting any meaningful research because of the lack of specific combat incidents as recalled by the appellant. The Department of the Navy advised that the RO request from the Marine Corps Historical Center command chronologies for the unit to which the appellant had been assigned. The RO was advised further to include the appellant's name, unit (by company, battalion, and regiment), and the specific month or operation for which historical information was required. In a September 1996 statement, the appellant stated that when he served with the 1st Marine Division, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he was on "[H]ill # 55 overlooking Ashau Valley." He stated that he participated in many "operation[s] out in Ash[a]u Valley." In September 1997 the Marine Corps Historical Center advised the RO that two of the units to which the appellant had been assigned had been in Vietnam when he served with them. In an October 1998 letter, the RO requested that the appellant provide additional information regarding his alleged stressors. The appellant did not reply to the RO's request. A supplemental statement of the case, which was mailed to the appellant in July 1999, was returned to the RO with the notation that the appellant was no longer at that address. In September 1999 the RO contacted the appellant's representative. The RO was informed that neither the appellant's representative nor the veterans' home where the appellant resided last had a forwarding address for the appellant. II. Analysis A. PTSD Service connection means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1999). It is the responsibility of a person seeking entitlement to service connection to present a well-grounded claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991). Establishing a well-grounded claim for service connection for a particular disability requires more than an allegation that the disability is service connected; it requires evidence relevant to the requirements for service connection and of sufficient weight to make the claim plausible and capable of substantiation. See Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 610 (1992); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). The kind of evidence needed to make a claim well grounded depends upon the types of issues presented by a claim. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 92-93 (1993). For some factual issues, competent lay evidence may be sufficient. However, where the claim involves issues of medical fact, such as medical causation or medical diagnoses, competent medical evidence is required. Id. at 93. A claim for service connection requires three elements to be well grounded. It requires competent (medical) evidence of a current disability; competent (lay or medical) evidence of incurrence or aggravation of disease or injury in service; and competent (medical) evidence of a nexus between the in- service injury or disease and the current disability. Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, sub nom. Epps v. West, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 2348 (1998); see also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 504 (1995); aff'd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). In general, the appellant's evidentiary assertions are accepted as true for the purpose of determining whether a well-grounded claim has been submitted. King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993). The medical evidence shows diagnoses of PTSD. The appellant has submitted competent lay statements of inservice experiences alleged to have caused his PTSD. Medical professionals have diagnosed PTSD based on the appellant's purported service experiences. This evidence is sufficient to create the plausibility of a valid claim. Therefore, it is sufficient for the establishment of a well-grounded claim. The appellant having stated a well-grounded claim, the Department has a duty to assist in the development of facts relating to the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). In this case, all relevant medical records referenced by the appellant have been obtained. The appellant has undergone a VA examination. In attempting to verify the appellant's stressors, the RO has contacted the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps Historical Center. The RO has requested more specific information from the appellant. The appellant has failed to respond. Cf. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991) (holding that duty to assist is not always a one-way street and that, if a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence). Because the appellant has not provided more specific information, further development of this claim is not indicated at this time. In the circumstances of this case, a remand would simply serve to impose an unnecessary burden with no gain to the appellant given that he has now apparently moved and left no forwarding address. See Franzen v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 235 (1996) (VA's obligation under § 5103(a) to assist claimant in filing his claim pertains to relevant evidence which may exist or could be obtained); Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 571 (1995). Therefore, the Board concludes that VA has satisfied its duty to assist the appellant in this case. Further, the RO's efforts have substantially complied with the instructions contained in the September 1998 Remand from the Board, to the extent possible under these circumstances. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). In order for a claim for service connection for PTSD to be successful there must be (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptoms and the claimed inservice stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1999); see also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App 128 (1997). Having determined that the appellant's claim is at least plausible and that the duty to assist has been fulfilled, the Board must assess the credibility and weight of the evidence. Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614 (1992). "Just because a physician or other health professional accepted appellant's description of his Vietnam experiences as credible and diagnosed appellant as suffering from PTSD does not mean the [Board is] required to grant service connection for PTSD." Id. at 618. The evidence is no longer presumed to be credible once an analysis of the claim on the merits is undertaken. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant's claim because there is no credible evidence indicating that the alleged stressors actually occurred. If the claimed stressor is related to combat, service department evidence that the appellant engaged in combat or that the appellant was awarded the Purple Heart Medal, Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat citation will be accepted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as conclusive evidence of the claimed inservice stressor. "Credible supporting evidence" of a non-combat stressor may be obtained from service records or other sources. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). However, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the Court) has held that the regulatory requirement for "credible supporting evidence" means that "the appellant's testimony, by itself, cannot, as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a non-combat stressor." Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163 (1996). The appellant has, at times, alleged that he engaged in combat with the enemy during service. A determination as to whether the appellant is a veteran of combat is particularly significant in a PTSD claim because he is entitled to have his lay statements as to his alleged stressors accepted, without corroboration, if he engaged in combat with the enemy. See Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353 (1998). The Court has held that: "[w]here it is determined, through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence, that the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressors are related to such combat, the veteran's lay testimony regarding claimed stressors must be accepted as conclusive as to their actual occurrence and no further development for corroborative evidence will be required, provided that the veteran's testimony is found to be 'satisfactory,' e.g., credible, and 'consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of [combat] service.'" Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d) (1999). Before this provision applies, the Board must make a specific finding that the appellant was engaged in combat with the enemy. See Zarycki, 6 Vet. App. 91. VA's General Counsel has defined the phrase "engaged in combat with the enemy" to mean that the appellant must have personally participated in a fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality. VAOPGCPREC 12-99. The fact that the appellant served in a "combat area" or "combat zone" does not mean that he himself engaged in combat with the enemy. Id. Moreover, a general statement in the appellant's service personnel records that he participated in a particular operation or campaign would not, in itself, establish that he engaged in combat with the enemy because the terms "operation" and "campaign" encompass both combat and non-combat activities. Id. Whether or not a veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy" must be determined through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence. No single item of evidence is determinative, and VA must assess the credibility, probative value, and relative weight of each relevant item of evidence. Id. The claimant's assertions that he engaged in combat with the enemy are not ignored, but are evaluated along with the other evidence of record. Id. However, the claimant's assertions that he "engaged in combat with the enemy" are not sufficient, by themselves, to establish this fact. The appellant's military personnel records reflect that he was served in Vietnam. He has been awarded a National Defense Service Medal, a Vietnam Campaign Medal, a Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and a Vietnam Service Medal. A National Defense Service Medal was awarded if a veteran served honorably between January 1, 1961, and August 14, 1974. United States of America Department of Defense Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, Appendix D at D-17, July 1990. A Vietnam Service Medal was awarded if a veteran served between July 4, 1965 and March 28, 1973 in Vietnam or in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia in direct support of the operations in Vietnam. Id. at D-20. A Vietnam Campaign Medal was awarded to all service personnel within the cited theater, and it does not rule in, or rule out, combat. United States of America Department of Defense Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, at 7-7, September 1996. The Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm was awarded by the Vietnamese government and may, or may not, signify that a veteran engaged in combat. The appellant's personnel records show that his primary military occupational specialty was an engineer equipment operator during the time period that he was in Vietnam. In this case, for the following reasons, the Board finds that the appellant did not engage in combat with the enemy. First, his military occupational specialty of engineer equipment operator while in Vietnam does not indicate combat service. Although it is possible that he engaged in combat with the enemy in Vietnam, his military occupational specialty does not, standing alone and unenhanced by additional proof of combat service, indicate that he did. There is no support in his military personnel records for his allegation that he participated in any shootouts. Second, the portion of the appellant's service personnel records that is reserved to record combat history contains no entries. Third, none of the appellant's awarded medals or decorations show combat service. Some of his awards do not specifically rule out participation in combat with the enemy. However, in conjunction with his military occupational specialty during the relevant time period and the absence of entries for combat in the appellant's service personnel records, the likelihood that one of these awards signifying potential combat was actually awarded for combat is slight. Although the appellant was diagnosed in September 1995 with superficial shrapnel wounds on his left leg, this diagnosis appears to have been based upon the history provided by the appellant. The appellant's separation examination, which showed no scars or injuries, is more probative. The preponderance of the evidence of record is against finding that the appellant engaged in combat with the enemy, and there is no reasonable doubt on this issue that could be resolved in his favor. A reasonable doubt exists where there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1999). It is a substantial doubt and one within the range of probability as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility. Id. It is not a means of reconciling actual conflict or a contradiction in the evidence. Id. In this case, for the reasons and bases discussed above, a reasonable doubt does not exist as to whether he engaged in combat with the enemy in Vietnam. Therefore, although the evidence shows that the appellant served overseas in Vietnam, the evidence does not support the conclusion that he engaged in combat with the enemy. Accordingly, the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) do not apply. Because the Board finds that the appellant did not engage in combat with the enemy, there must be credible supporting evidence of record that the alleged stressors actually occurred in order to warrant service connection. His lay testimony is insufficient, standing alone, to establish service connection. Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 147 (citing Moreau, 9 Vet. App. at 395). There is nothing in this case corroborating the appellant's claimed stressors. Accordingly, there is no credible supporting evidence that the claimed stressors actually occurred. In an effort to assist the appellant, the RO attempted to verify the claimed stressors with the Department of the Navy and contacted the Marine Corps Historical Center. Also, in order to make an informed decision and to afford the appellant every consideration, the RO asked him on numerous occasions to provide specific details as to his alleged inservice stressors (names, places, dates, units of assignment, description of events). He has been unable to do so. The appellant has only made general allegations, such as he saw people killed and injured, he saw body parts, and his experiences were stressful. The appellant has not, at any time, provided names of people he saw killed or injured or any details about any specific stressful incident. Accordingly, it is manifest that these anecdotal incidents are not subject to verification. After a thorough review of the evidence of record, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant's claim for service connection for PTSD. Although the appellant has been diagnosed with PTSD, there is no evidence of record corroborating that the alleged inservice stressors actually occurred. The newspaper clippings provided by the appellant indicate only that the appellant served in Vietnam. The appellant is not entitled to the application of the benefit of the doubt; there is no reasonable doubt on this issue that could be resolved in his favor. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 1991). The Board is cognizant of the appellant's own statements and his spouse's statement to the effect that he experiences symptoms of PTSD that are due to stressors while in service. However, because the evidence does not indicate that they possess medical expertise, they are not competent to render an opinion on a matter involving medical knowledge, such as diagnosis or causation. See Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 384, 388 (1995); Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 74 (1995); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). B. Shrapnel Wounds to the Left Leg The appellant claims entitlement to service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg, which he alleges were incurred in combat with the enemy. In the case of any veteran who engaged in combat with the enemy in active service with a military, naval or air organization of the United States during a period of war, campaign, or expedition, VA shall accept as sufficient proof of service connection any disease or injury alleged to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service satisfactory lay or other evidence of service incurrence or aggravation of such injury or disease, if consistent with the circumstances, conditions or hardships of such service, notwithstanding the fact that there is no official record of such incurrence or aggravation in such service, and to that end shall resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran. Service connection of such injury or disease may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991). As discussed in the previous section, the Board remanded this case in September 1998 to develop the issue of whether the appellant had engaged in combat with the enemy. In spite of the diligent efforts by the RO, the appellant failed to provide information necessary to the development of his case. Based on the evidence of record, and for the reasons noted previously, the Board has determined that the appellant did not engage in combat with the enemy. Accordingly, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154 does not apply in this case. In making a claim for service connection, the veteran has the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). "A well grounded claim is a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation." Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). A "well grounded" claim for service connection requires evidence of a current disability as provided by a medical diagnosis; evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service as provided by either lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates; and, a nexus, or link, between the in-service disease or injury and the current disability as provided by competent medical evidence. See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995); see also 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Establishing direct service connection for a disability that was not clearly present in service requires the existence of a current disability and a relationship or connection between that disability and a disease contracted or an injury sustained during service. See Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141 (1992). Service connection may also be granted on a secondary basis and for certain enumerated disabilities on a presumptive basis, see 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (1999), or alternatively, with respect to any disease, if all the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service, see 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1999). Moreover, establishing a well-grounded claim for service connection for a particular disability requires more than an allegation that the particular disability had its onset in service. It requires evidence relevant to the requirements for service connection cited above and of sufficient weight to make the claim plausible and capable of substantiation. See Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609 (1992); see also Murphy, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81. The kind of evidence needed to make a claim well grounded depends upon the types of issues presented by the claim. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 92-93 (1993). For some factual issues, competent lay evidence may be sufficient. However, where the claim involves issues of medical fact, such as medical causation or medical diagnoses, competent medical evidence is required. Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93. Competent medical evidence establishing a nexus, or link, between the conditions treated or diagnosed after service and those noted in service is required to support a well-grounded claim for service connection. Whether certain symptoms can be said with any degree of medical certainty to be early manifestations of a disorder first diagnosed years later is a medical question requiring medical evidence for its resolution. See Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 494-95. In this case, there is no competent medical evidence linking the appellant's scars on his left leg to any disease or injury in service. Although the appellant was diagnosed at a September 1995 VA examination with superficial shrapnel wounds on his left leg, this diagnosis appears to have been based upon the history provided by the appellant. The Court has held that the Board need not accept the opinion of a medical treatment provider where, as here, the provider's conclusions are based on a history provided by a claimant. Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993). The appellant's service medical records do not contain any evidence of treatment for shrapnel wounds. The appellant's separation examination showed no scars or injuries. No other medical opinion relates the appellant's current scars to service. Considering the foregoing facts, it is obvious that the appellant has not submitted evidence sufficient to render his claim of service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg well grounded. Caluza, 7 Vet. App. 498. The appellant's contentions and statements on appeal have been considered carefully; however, this evidence alone cannot meet the burden imposed by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) with respect to the existence of a disability and a relationship between that disability and his service. Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. 492. The Board understands that the appellant believes that the scars on his left leg are causally related to service; however, he lacks the medical expertise to enter an opinion regarding a causal relationship between this disability and any claimed in-service onset or a secondary relationship to a service-connected disability. See id. at 494-95. His assertions of medical causation alone are not probative because lay persons (i.e., persons without medical expertise) are not competent to offer medical opinions. Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211 (1993); Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. 91; Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. 492. On the basis of the above findings, the Board can identify no basis in the record that would make the appellant's claim plausible or possible. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); see Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. at 92; Tirpak, 2 Vet. App. at 610-11; Murphy, 1 Vet. App. at 81. Where the veteran has not met this burden, VA has no further duty to assist him in developing facts pertinent to his claim, including no duty to provide him with a medical examination. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); Rabideau, 2 Vet. App. at 144 (where the claim was not well grounded, VA was under no duty to provide the veteran with an examination). Although where a claim is not well grounded VA does not have a statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing facts pertinent to the claim, VA may be obligated under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) to advise a claimant of evidence needed to complete his or her application if on notice that relevant evidence exists or may be obtainable. This obligation depends on the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the Secretary has advised the claimant of the evidence necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim (see Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995)), which depends further upon the Department having notice that relevant evidence may exist or could be obtained (see Franzen v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 235 (1996)). See also Epps v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 341 (1996) (sec. 5103(a) duty attaches only where there is an incomplete application which references other known and existing evidence that pertains to the claim under consideration); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991) (VA's "duty" is just what it states, a duty to assist, not a duty to prove a claim). Nothing in the record suggests the existence of evidence that might render plausible the claim that is not currently well grounded. Accordingly, the Board must deny the appellant's claim for service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg as not well grounded. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the left leg is denied. CHRISTOPHER P. KISSEL Acting Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals