Citation Nr: 0001401 Decision Date: 01/18/00 Archive Date: 01/27/00 DOCKET NO. 96-18 151 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Lincoln, Nebraska THE ISSUE Entitlement to an increased evaluation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), currently rated at 50 percent disabling. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: John Stevens Berry, Attorney WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Nicholas M. Auricchio, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from October 1968 to October 1972. This matter is currently before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) on appeal from an April 1994 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Lincoln, Nebraska. In a January 1999 decision, the Board denied the instant claim. The veteran appealed the Board's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In May 1999, counsel for the appellant and VA filed a Joint Motion for Remand. An Order of the Court dated in May 1999 granted the motion and vacated the Board's decision of January 1999. REMAND As a preliminary matter, the Board finds that the veteran's claim for an increased evaluation is plausible and thus well- grounded within the meaning of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (1991); see Proscelle v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 629 (1992) (a claim of entitlement to an increased evaluation for a service- connected disability generally is a well-grounded claim). After reviewing the claims files the Board finds that additional development is in order with respect to the veteran's claim currently on appeal. In this respect, the Board finds that in order to properly satisfy the Court's May 1999 Order, the veteran must be given a new VA psychiatric examination. Additional clinical data are needed in order to properly evaluate the veteran's PTSD as his last VA examination was given in June 1997. As part of this examination, the VA examiner must assign one global assessment of functioning (GAF) score for the period from the date the veteran reopened his claim on November 18, 1993 to the present. This score must reflect the average degree of disability shown, and must be reconciled with any prior score. Finally, as the Court has ordered VA to consider the role that PTSD has played in the appellant's martial relationships, the Board finds that securing copies of any divorce court proceedings would be illustrative of the degree of disability presented. Therefore, this case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The veteran should be contracted and requested to provide the RO with written authorization to secure copies of any and all divorce court files relating to any failed marriage. This authorization should include the name and location of each and every divorce court, as well as the date of any court order granting a divorce. 2. The RO should schedule the appellant for an examination by a VA psychiatrist to determine the nature and extent of his PTSD. All necessary evaluations, tests, and studies, including the assignment of a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score, deemed appropriate should be performed. As part of this examination, the examiner must assign one GAF score representing the overall average degree of impairment caused by PTSD alone since November 1993 to the present. A separate assessment also must be offered discussing the degree of social and industrial impairment caused by alcohol and or drug abuse. All opinions and supporting rationales must be in writing. Since it is important that each disability be viewed in relation to its history, the veteran's claims folders, and a copy of this REMAND, must be made available to and reviewed by the examiner prior to conducting the requested examination. 3. For the requested examination the appellant must be given adequate notice, to include advising him of the consequences of failure to report for the examination. If he fails to report for the examination, this fact should be noted in the claims folders and a copy of the scheduling notice should be obtained by the RO and associated with the claims folders. 4. Following completion of the foregoing, the RO should review the claims files to ensure that all of the foregoing development has been completed in full, to include a review of the examination. If the requested development is not in complete compliance with the instructions provided above, appropriate action should be taken. Upon completion of the above development, the RO should readjudicate the issue on appeal. If the determination remains adverse to the veteran, he and his representative should be furnished with a supplemental statement of the case in accordance with 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(d) (West 1991) and be given an opportunity to respond. The purpose of this REMAND is to fulfill the Order of the Court. The Board does not intimate any opinion as to the merits of the case, either favorable or unfavorable, at this time. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1999) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.44- 8.45 and 38.02-38.03. DEREK R. BROWN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1999).