BVA9504773 
DOCKET NO.  93-11 958     )       DATE
          )
          )

On appeal from the decision of the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Atlanta,
Georgia

THE ISSUE

Entitlement to consideration of waiver of recovery of loan
guaranty indebtedness.

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

J.W. Engle, Counsel

REMAND

Review of the record reveals that in March 1987 the original
veteran obtained a loan for the purposes of an interest rate
reduction refinance in the amount of $65,850.00 which was
guaranteed, in part, by VA for the purchase of a home located in
Hephzibah, Georgia.  In November 1987 the original veteran sold
the subject property and allowed the loan to be assumed by the
purchaser.  In March 1989 the appellant purchased the subject
property by assuming the loan.  In June 1991, VA

determined that the loan was current at the time of transfer from
the original veteran, that the transferee was found to be legally
liable for the debt to the government arising from the
termination of the loan and the resultant payment of the loan
guaranty claim and that the transferee was found to be a
satisfactory credit risk based upon payment of 22 installment
payments after the assumption. Accordingly, the original veteran
obligor was released from liability pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 3713(b) (West 1991).

In September 1992 the appellant requested waiver of the
outstanding loan guaranty indebtedness.  While various references
noted within the loan guaranty file suggest that the appellant is
in fact a veteran, e.g. reference to employment as "Provost
Marshall" in the Notice of Default dated in November 1989 and
December 1990 as well as the notation of employment as a "Federal
Employee" on the Referral of Indebtedness to Committee on Waivers
and Compromises dated in September 1992, and his reference to
receiving a pension in his Financial Status Report also dated in
September 1992, there is no specific evidence of record to
establish that the appellant is entitled to consideration of
waiver of recovery of the outstanding loan guaranty indebtedness.

In view of the above, the Board believes that consideration of
the September 1992 waiver request under 38 C.F.R. § 1.965 may
have been premature.  See Reyes v. Brown, No. 93-996 (U.S.
Vet.App. Oct. 21, 1994) (VA must abide by the chronological
obligations inherent in its adjudication process).  Prior to its
consideration of a veteran's request for a waiver of loan
guaranty indebtedness, VARO must first establish whether the
veteran is eligible for a waiver.  See 38 C.F.R. § 1.964(f)
(1994).  Accordingly, the Board is obligated to refer
consideration of the eligibility question to VARO for appropriate
development and adjudication.  See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App.
384 (1994) (to avoid prejudice to the appellant, the Board will
not consider an issue that had not been addressed by VARO where
the appellant has not been given adequate notice and opportunity
to submit evidence or present argument on that issue).

Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to VARO for the following
development:

The Committee on Waivers and Compromises
should determine whether the appellant is a
veteran or a nonveteran obligor.  Then, a
determination must be made as to whether
the debt of the appellant is excluded from
waiver consideration under 38 C.F.R.
§ 1.964(f)(1994).

Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board, if in
order.  The Board intimates no opinion as to the ultimate outcome
of this case.  The appellant need take no action unless otherwise
notified.

          KENNETH R. ANDREWS, JR.
          Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals

The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, ___
(1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be
assigned to an individual member of the Board for a
determination.  This proceeding has been assigned to an
individual member of the Board.

Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 1991), only a decision of the
Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States
Court of Veterans Appeals.  This remand is in the nature of a
preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board
on the merits of your appeal.  38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1994).