Citation Nr: 0000019 Decision Date: 01/03/00 Archive Date: 12/28/01 DOCKET NO. 98-11 312 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, Puerto Rico THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for organic brain syndrome as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic headaches. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Puerto Rico Public Advocate for Veterans Affairs WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant and Father ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Eckart, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty for training from May 21, 1986 to July 18, 1986 and from February 6, 1987 to May 29, 1987. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a rating decision of February 1998 from the San Juan, Puerto Rico Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which denied entitlement to service connection for organic brain syndrome as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic headaches. It is noted that the appellant and his father appeared at a hearing before a hearing officer at the RO on May 21, 1998, at which time they testified with respect to the claims now at issue before the Board. A transcript of that hearing has been associated with the record on appeal. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran is shown to have been treated and placed under observation for a head injury with headache complaints in July 1986 and was placed on permanent disability for posttraumatic headaches in March 1990. 2. Private treatment records from December 1997, February 1998, March 1998 and March 1999 give the medical opinion that the veteran has a mental disorder of organic origin, which is related to his inservice head injury. 3. The veteran is shown to have evidence of a current psychiatric disability, diagnosed most recently as dysthymia on the April 1999 VA examination. 4. The veteran's claim for service connection for organic brain syndrome as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic headaches is plausible, but the RO has not obtain sufficient evidence for correct disposition of the claim. CONCLUSION OF LAW The claim of entitlement to service connection for organic brain syndrome as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic headaches is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (table). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Background-Pertinent Legal Principles of Well Groundedness In Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 940 (1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), the VA has a duty to assist only those claimants who have established well grounded (i.e., plausible) claims. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) issued a decision holding that VA cannot assist a claimant in developing a claim which is not well grounded. Morton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 477 (July 14, 1999), req. for en banc consideration by a judge denied, No. 96-1517 (U.S. Vet. App. July 28, 1999) (per curiam). Once a claimant has submitted evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that a claim is well-grounded, the claimant's initial burden has been met, and VA is obligated under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) to assist the claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the claim. Accordingly, the threshold question that must be resolved in this appeal is whether the appellant has presented evidence that the claim is well grounded; that is, that the claim is plausible. In order for a claim to be well grounded, there must be (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Epps, 126 F.3d at 1468; Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (table). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or etiology, or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is "plausible" or "possible" is required. Epps, 126 F.3d at 1468. Further, in determining whether a claim is well-grounded, the supporting evidence is presumed to be true and is not subject to weighing. King v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 19, 21 (1993). In regard to establishing a well-grounded claim, the second and third Epps and Caluza elements (incurrence and nexus evidence) can also be satisfied under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (1999) by (1) evidence that a condition was "noted" during service or during an applicable presumption period; (2) evidence showing postservice continuity of symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the postservice symptomatology. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997). Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 496. Moreover, a condition "noted during service" does not require any type of special or written documentation, such as being recorded in an examination report, either contemporaneous to service or otherwise, for purposes of showing that the condition was observed during service or during the presumption period. Id. at 496-97. However, medical evidence is required to demonstrate a relationship between the present disability and the demonstrated continuity of symptomatology unless such a relationship is one as to which a lay person's observation is competent. Id. at 497. Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury incurred or aggravated while on active military, naval, or air service. Active military, naval, or air service includes active duty, any period of active duty for training during which the veteran was disabled or died from a disease or injury, or inactive duty training during which the veteran was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(24), 1110, 1131 (West 1991). In the case of a disease only, service connection also may be established under section 3.303(b) by (1) evidence of the existence of a chronic disease in service or of a disease, eligible for presumptive service connection pursuant to statute or regulation, during the applicable presumption period; and (2) present disability from it. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495. Either evidence contemporaneous with service or the presumption period or evidence that is post service or post presumption period may suffice. Id. Factual Background Service medical records reveal that on July 4, 1986 during his period of active duty for training, the veteran was placed under observation for a head injury. The exact time, date, place and circumstances surrounding the head injury were reported as unknown. He complained of headaches on July 6, 1986, was taken to the hospital, and released on July 7, 1986. An August 1986 line of duty determination concluded that the head injury was in the line of duty. In October 1986, on follow-up, he was diagnosed with post concussive syndrome, atypical (psychological factors affecting physical illness.) He was found to have been injured during basic training. In a March 1990 Medical Board proceeding, the veteran was assessed with post traumatic headaches, occurring 3 to 4 times a week, with loss of consciousness 2 to 3 times a week, with histrionic personality features and no pathological neurological findings, rated as definite. The Medical Board found the veteran to be unfit to perform his duties of his military occupational specialty and grade because of a disability associated with migraine headaches. On VA psychiatric evaluation in June 1990, the diagnoses were psychological factors affecting a physical condition and a histrionic personality disorder. The evaluation report included a history of the appellant having undergone multiple hospitalizations and evaluations for complaints of recurrent headaches, and also noted a diagnosis at one point of adjustment disorder. This examiner reached the conclusion however, that the veteran's condition was definitely secondary to his personality make up. By rating decision of March 1990, the RO granted service connection for posttraumatic headaches and denied service connection for a claimed nervous condition, which was determined to be a personality disorder. The matter was appealed to the Board, which upheld the denial of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder in a July 1996 decision, following additional development of the matter. VA treatment records from 1990 through 1991 reveal ongoing treatment for the veteran's headaches and complaints of nervousness, although no opinion was made regarding whether there was a relationship between the two complaints. In August 1991, a diagnosis to rule out borderline personality disorder was made. The report from a VA psychiatric examination conducted in April 1995 indicates a diagnosis of histrionic personality disorder. This examination determined that there was no specific disorder for an Axis I determination, and that the complaints, history and exploration were very vague and that basically, a personality structure seemed to predominate. Translations of private treatment records that were written in Spanish included large volumes of treatment for psychiatric, seizure and headache complaints from 1987 through 1999. Also translated from Spanish to English were school records from 1979 through 1982. Included in these treatment records are several treatment records which are of particular significance. These include the treatment record from February 1998, which notes as follows: "the pt gets convulsions and his bizarre episodes when they appear are of organic mental origin. Prognosis, poor, because of the mental organic." An April 1998 treatment record diagnosed him as having major depression, secondary to the cerebral organic. Finally, there is a report from March 1999, which noted a history of the veteran having suffered a cranial trauma which caused him to have a cerebral concussion in June 1986, with hospitalization due to headaches in July 1986 from which he continues to suffer. This treatment record noted that since the appellant had a cerebral trauma in active service, he has been suffering continuously from frequent and severe headaches, during which, he is in the habit of beating his head against the wall, and with the evidence of this shown as scars on his forehead plus he becomes destructive and aggressive. The diagnostic impression from March 1999 was of organic cerebral syndrome, major depression with psychotic aspects and posttraumatic headaches. In addition to the translated medical evidence, there is of record, a private treatment record from December 1997, that gives the opinion that the appellant fell some 60 feet during basic training, and sustained a trauma to the head with loss of consciousness followed by amnesia that is still present. This treatment record noted the history of headaches and convulsive seizures. The physician's opinion was that the patient's mental condition is organic in nature and is secondary to the trauma to the head suffered in basic training in 1986. Also of record is testimony from the RO hearing held in May 1998, wherein the appellant testified that he injured his head during basic training when he fell from a 65 foot tower in a "confidence course." He testified that since the accident, he has suffered headaches, black outs and psychiatric problems. The report from a VA examination conducted in April 1999, included an examination of the veteran, with the claims folder available. The history given included that of the head trauma in 1986 with post-traumatic migratoid headaches and a recent history that included normal computerized tomography (CT) findings in December 1987 and normal magnetic resonance image (MRI) findings from August 1998, plus the history of diagnosed histrionic personality traits in the 1995 VA examination. The examination does not appear to include the review of the history from the recently translated treatment record from 1997 through 1999, some of which include opinions that the veteran is suffering from a psychiatric disorder of organic origin. The diagnoses were Axis I dysthymia, and Axis II mixed personality disorder, with borderline, dependent and histrionic features. The opinion given, based on his history and records reviewed in the claims folder, was that the veteran does not meet the diagnostic criteria for organic brain syndrome. The opinion further given was that the veteran has only suffered headaches after the incident during service, and only recently presented with depressive symptoms in reaction to his physical disabilities present since 1991. His most disabling condition was viewed to be his characterological disorder. Analysis Upon review of the evidence, the Board finds that the claim for service connection for organic brain syndrome is well- grounded. The service medical records show that in July 1986, the veteran was under medical observation for a head injury, with complaints of headaches. He was assessed with post concussive syndrome, atypical (psychological features affecting physical illness) in October 1986 and was placed on permanent disability for post-traumatic migranoid headaches in March 1990. Thus there is evidence of an inservice head injury. The veteran is also shown to have long standing treatment for psychiatric complaints, most recently diagnosed as dysthymia in April 1999. Finally, there is of record a medical opinion from December 1997, which determined that the veteran is suffering a mental condition, which is organic in nature and secondary to the trauma to the head suffered in basic training in 1986. This medical opinion, accepted as true for well groundedness purposes, shows a nexus between the veteran's psychiatric pathology and his head injury during active duty for training in 1986. Additionally, the translated medical records from February 1998, April 1998 and March 1998 all suggest that the veteran has a psychiatric disorder, which was diagnosed in March 1998 as major depression with psychotic features, and these records also suggest that there is an organic basis for his mental condition. Consequently, all three criteria of Caluza, supra have been met and this claim is well-grounded. ORDER The claim of entitlement to service connection for organic brain syndrome as secondary to service-connected posttraumatic headaches is well grounded. To this extent only, the appeal is granted. REMAND Because the claim of entitlement to service connection for organic brain syndrome is well grounded, VA has a duty to assist the appellant in developing facts pertinent to the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (1999); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78 (1990). Upon review of the evidence, the Board finds that further development in this case is warranted. Currently the record contains conflicting evidence regarding the nature and cause of his claimed mental disability. That the veteran sustained some form of head injury during active service is undisputed. However, there is some dispute as to whether the veteran has a psychiatric disorder either as a direct result from the head injury, or as secondary to pain from his service- connected headache disorder or due to personality disorder. The Board notes that some of the private medical records from 1997 through 1999, as discussed above, give the opinion that the veteran does have an organic mental disorder secondary to the inservice head injury. In contrast, the VA examinations from June 1990, April 1995 and April 1999, have determined the veteran's claimed mental problems to be due to a personality disorder, which is a congenital disability not subject to service connection. What is problematic regarding the opinions rendered in the most recent VA examination of April 1999, is that it did not appear to include a review of these private treatment records which suggest that the veteran does have an organic brain disorder. The April 1999 VA examination also appears to raise another question regarding the nature and etiology of the appellant's claimed disorder, in that it notes that the veteran's depressive symptoms were presented "in reaction to his physical disabilities present since 1991." This raises the possibility that, even if there is no psychiatric disorder as a direct result of the inservice head injury, there may in fact be a psychiatric disorder secondary to the physical pain caused by the service-connected headaches. Finally, the Board finds that given the differential diagnoses for his claimed disorder throughout the record, clarification is needed. In view of the foregoing, further appellate consideration will be deferred, and the case is REMANDED to the RO for the following: 1. The RO should contact the veteran to determine the names, addresses, and dates of treatments of any and all medical care providers who treated the veteran for any psychiatric problems, not already associated with the claims file. All pieces of correspondence, as well as any medical or treatment records obtained, should be made a part of the claims folder. If private treatment is reported and those records are not obtained, the veteran and his representative should be provided with information concerning the negative results and afforded an opportunity to obtain the records. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (1999). 2. Thereafter, the veteran should be scheduled for a VA examination(s) to ascertain the nature and severity of his claimed organic brain syndrome(s). A panel of 2 psychiatrists should conduct this examination. A neurologist familiar with head injuries should also examine him. The report of the examination should include a detailed account of all pathology and manifestations associated with any residuals of a head injury disability found to be present. All indicated tests, including psychological, MRI and neurological evaluations, should be accomplished and all clinical findings and subjective complaints should be reported in detail. The claims folder should be provided to the examiner prior to the examination. In conducting the examination, the examiner(s) should express an opinion as to the extent of his physical and mental complaints as they relate to the inservice head injury. To the extent that a period of hospitalization for observation and evaluation is indicated, one should be scheduled to determine the nature and severity of his claimed organic brain syndrome. The examiner must be requested to review the available medical records, as well as the history of the veteran's service connected headaches, and express opinions on the following questions: (1) the exact current diagnosis of any disability related to the inservice head injury, and of any psychological or psychiatric pathology and whether any of these conditions are acquired or congenital; (2) the degree of probability that any psychiatric or psychological disorder is the proximate result of a head trauma in service; (3) whether there is a reasonable probability that any current psychiatric disorder could be related to his inservice headaches to include as being secondary to pain and physical disability caused by his service-connected posttraumatic headache syndrome; (4) whether based on the medical findings noted in service there is a reasonable probability that any congenital disorder was permanently aggravated or became worse during his service. The claims folder as well as a copy of this remand must be made available to and reviewed by the examiners prior to the examination. The examiners must provide full rationale for all opinions and conclusions reached. 3. Subsequently, the RO should review the claims folder and ensure that all of the foregoing development actions have been conducted and completed in full. If any development is incomplete, appropriate corrective action is to be implemented. Specific attention is directed to the examination report. If the report does not include fully detailed descriptions of pathology or adequate responses to the specific opinions requested, the report must be returned to the examiner for corrective action. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1996) "if the [examination] report does not contain sufficient detail it is incumbent upon the rating board to return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes." Green v. Derwinski, 1. Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991); Abernathy v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 461, 464 (1992); and Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 405, 407 (1994). 4. After the development requested above has been completed, the RO should readjudicate the veteran's claim. If the issue remains denied, the veteran and his representative should be provided a supplemental statement of the case in accordance with 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 1991), which includes a summary of additional evidence submitted, any additional applicable laws and regulations, and reasons and bases for the decision reached. They should be afforded the appropriate period of time within which to respond thereto. Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board for further appellate consideration, if otherwise in order. The Board intimates no opinion, either legal or factual, as to the ultimate disposition of this case. The veteran need take no action unless otherwise notified. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1999) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21- 1, Part IV, paras. 8.44-8.45 and 38.02-38.03. A. BRYANT Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals