Citation Nr: 0006896 Decision Date: 03/14/00 Archive Date: 03/17/00 DOCKET NO. 96-17 166 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a back injury. 2. Entitlement to service connection for headaches. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD W. Yates, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant served on active duty from January 1955 to November 1958. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 1994 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in New Orleans, Louisiana. That rating decision, in pertinent part, denied service connection for residuals of a back injury and headaches. The case was previously before the Board in July 1998, when it was remanded for additional development. The requested development has been completed. The Board now proceeds with its review of the appeal. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The RO has obtained all relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the veteran's appeal. 2. There is no competent medical evidence of a chronic back injury or headache disorder having been incurred in or aggravated during service. 3. There is no post service medical evidence showing continuity of symptomatology associated with any inservice chronic back injury or headache disorder. 4. The first post service complaint of back pain or headaches was dated in March 1993, over 34 years after the veteran's discharge from the service. 5. There is no medical opinion, or other competent evidence, linking the veteran's current back disorder or headache disorder to his active duty military service or to an injury incurred during his active military service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Residuals of a back injury were not incurred in, or aggravated by, active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 101(24), 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (1999). 2. A headache disorder was not incurred in, or aggravated by, active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 101(24), 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (1999). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Preliminary Considerations Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (1999). Service connection may be established for a current disability in several ways, including on a "direct" basis, on the basis of "aggravation," and on a "presumptive" basis. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 1110, 1131, 1153 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(a), (b), (c), 3.306(a), (b), 3.307, 3.309 (1999). Direct service connection may be established for a disability resulting from diseases or injuries which are clearly present in service or for a disease diagnosed after discharge from service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (b), (d) (1999). Establishing direct service connection for a disability which has not been clearly shown in service requires the existence of a current disability and a relationship or connection between that disability and a disease contracted or an injury sustained during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1999); Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143 (1992). The law provides that "a person who submits a claim for benefits under a law administered by the Secretary shall have the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). Establishing a well-grounded claim for service connection for a particular disability requires more than an allegation that the disability had its onset in service or is service connected; it requires evidence relevant to the requirements for service connection and of sufficient weight to make the claim plausible and capable of substantiation. See Franko v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 502, 505 (1993); Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 610 (1992); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). The three elements of a "well grounded" claim are: (1) evidence of a current disability as provided by a medical diagnosis; (2) evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service as provided by either lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates; and, (3) a nexus, or link, between the inservice disease or injury and the current disability as provided by competent medical evidence. See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). Alternatively, the third Caluza element can be satisfied under 38 CFR 3.303(b) (1999) by evidence of continuity of symptomatology and medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the symptomatology. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495 (1997). II. Factual Background The RO has retrieved the veteran's service medical records and they appear to be complete. A review of the veteran's Form DD 214 reveals that he served on active duty in the United States Air Force from January 1955 to November 1958. The report of the veteran's entrance examination, dated in January 1955, shows diagnoses of deviated septum, mild, right, and third degree pes planus, asymptomatic, with pronation. The veteran's service medical records reveal treatment for a variety of conditions. An inservice medical treatment report, dated in December 1956, notes complaints of back trouble. In September 1957, the veteran sought treatment for a sore throat, headaches and weakness. Physical examination revealed his chest to be clear. A November 1957 treatment report notes the veteran's complaints of painful back muscles. No follow-up treatment was indicated. In January 1958, the veteran was injured by an exploding jet airplane tire. A hospitalization report, dated in January 1958, notes that he suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the left olecranon process and an oblique fracture of the right, 5th metacarpal (small finger). The report also notes that the veteran was treated for lacerations to the left forehead and chin, right side. In November 1958, the veteran's discharge examination was conducted and the report of this examination shows no complaints or diagnoses of headaches or a back disorder. In November 1958, the veteran filed an application for compensation or pension, VA Form 8-526, seeking entitlement to service connection for "residuals of broken elbow, left." The form contains no reference to a back disorder or headaches. In May 1959, a VA general physical examination was conducted. The report of this examination notes the veteran's history of injuring his left elbow and his right hand during service. No complaints relating to or findings noting the existence of a back disorder or headaches were indicated. Medical treatment reports, dated August 1988 to May 1993, were obtained from the VA medical center in New Orleans, Louisiana. A treatment report, dated in January 1989, notes that the veteran had no complaints and was "doing fine." A May 1993 treatment report notes the veteran's complaints of frequent headaches. The report concludes with a diagnostic impression of probable sleep apnea. A treatment report, dated in November 1993, notes the veteran's complaints of back pain and headaches, "sinus/constant." In addressing his medical history, the report notes that he previously "fell off horse" and "accid. in service." It also noted that the veteran was treated for a gunshot wound in the left chest and arm in 1961. A medical treatment report, dated in May 1994, was submitted by B. Vasconcellos, D.C. Dr. Vasconcellos noted that she had been treating the veteran for low back pain since November 1993. X-ray examination of the back revealed an impression of left lumbar scoliosis; right flexion of L2 on L3 and L3 on L4; left flexion of L4 on L5; right lateral spurring of L4, hypertrophic degenerative changes of L5; and low left ilium. Dr. Vasconcellos also noted "that this has been a problem of long standing duration." In February 1996, the veteran filed his substantive appeal, VA Form 9. He alleged that his back and headache disorders resulted from the inservice tire explosion. Specifically, he stated that "I was slam[m]ed backwards at tremendous force. I hit a wall behind me, bounced off it and hit another wall. Evidently the damage done developed over a period of time. I live with a constant back ache." In September 1997, an opinion letter was received from M. Stelzer, M.D. In his letter, Dr. Stelzer indicated that his clinic was treating the veteran for headaches and back pain. He also stated: It was reported to me that while in the air force [the veteran] was severely injured in 1958 in a tire explosion in which he literally bounced off of two walls. It is my professional opinion that [the veteran's] current condition, although not unique to severe physical trauma, is due in part to his earlier injury that occurred while in the air force in 1958. I believe that if [the veteran] had not suffered the above referenced injury in 1958 that it would be far less likely that he would suffer from his current condition for which he is receiving treatment today. In October 1998, following the Board's remand herein, the veteran submitted a statement indicating that he had attempted to contact all of the doctors who had treated him for a back disorder or headaches since his discharge from the service. He noted that "most were either no longer in practice or dead." Also enclosed with his statement were the replies he had received. In particular was a treatment summary report from T. Yang, M.D. In his report, Dr. Yang indicated that he treated the veteran from April to May 1993. He further noted that the veteran "was initially examined and treated as an out-patient for the chronic, recurring symptom of low back pain, hand and elbow pain. I administered transcutaneous electro-nerve stimulation, using fine needle electrodes." In addition, the veteran submitted a medical treatment summary report from H. Karas, M.D. Dr. Karas noted that he had treated the veteran from August to September 1995 for sinus, headaches, itching skin, vertigo, and low back pain. Dr. Karas also noted that the veteran "has a number of spinal segmental dysfunctions." In February 1998, a treatment summary statement was submitted by N. Magpac, M.D., who Dr. Magpac noted that she had treated the veteran one time in August 1993 for degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine. In November 1998, the veteran submitted X-ray films of his back, performed in August 1995, that he obtained from the Metairie Chiropractor Clinic. In January 1999, the X-ray films were reviewed by the Chief of Radiology, VA medical clinic in New Orleans, Louisiana. In his report, the Chief of Radiology indicated that the X-rays were not taken at the correct position and were "totally inadequate for interpretation and useless for evaluation." In February 1999, the veteran submitted a letter in support of his claim. In his letter, the veteran indicated that he had informed Dr. Seltzer that he "had never been injured except for my accident while in the U.S.A.F. and that couldn't be the cause since I did not start to have problems until two years later." He also noted that "since I never talked to other doctors about how it happened any reports you receive from other doctors will not mention my accident in the military because it never came up with them." In addressing his claim for service connection for headaches, the veteran stated "[m]y nose was broken about three years before I joined the Air Force. However, my nose was broken again in the accident. My whole face was swollen and my nose hurt tremendously." Medical treatment reports, dated March 1999 to June 1999, were retrieved from Charity Hospital. A review of these records was negative for treatment for or diagnoses of headaches or a back disorder. III. Analysis Initially, the Board finds that the veteran's claims for service connection for residuals of a back injury and for a headache disorder are "well grounded" within the meaning of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991). That is, he has presented claims which are plausible. See Arms v. West, 12 Vet. App. 188, 195 (1999) (noting that generally "only the evidence in support of the claim is to be considered and generally a presumption of credibility attaches to that evidence in order to decide whether or not any VA claimant has sustained the claimant's burden of submitting a well-grounded claim under section 5107(a)" (first emphasis added)). All relevant facts have been properly developed and no further assistance to the appellant is required to comply with the duty to assist mandated by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). Review of the appellant's claims requires the Board to provide a written statement of the reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions on material issues of fact and law. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d)(1) (West 1991). The statement must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). See Simon v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 621, 622 (1992); Masors v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 181, 188 (1992). To comply with this requirement, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the appellant. See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F. 3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table); Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994). Furthermore, as the Court has pointed out, the Board may not base a decision on its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions but, rather, may reach a medical conclusion only on the basis of independent medical evidence in the record or adequate quotation from recognized medical treatises. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991). Moreover, the Board has the duty to assess the credibility and weight to be given to the evidence. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed.Cir.1997) and cases cited therein. Once the evidence is assembled, the Secretary is responsible for determining whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). If so, the claim is denied; if the evidence is in support of the claim or is in equal balance, the claim is allowed. See also Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). A. Residuals of Back Injury In this case, the veteran contends that his back was injured by an exploding tire in January 1958. The determinative issues presented by this claim are: (1) whether the veteran incurred, or aggravated, a chronic back disorder during service; (2) whether he has a current disability; and, if so, (3) whether the current disability is etiologically related to his active military service. As the veteran's alleged inservice back injuries were not sustained in combat, the presumption under 38 U.S.C.A. §1154 does not apply. After a thorough review of the veteran's claim file, the Board concludes that the medical evidence of record does not show that a chronic back disorder was incurred during a period of active duty service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (1999). Although the veteran was injured by an exploding jet tire in January 1958, there is no indication that this incident resulted in a chronic back disorder. The inservice medical treatment reports following this incident are silent as to any complaints of a back injury. In November 1958, the veteran's discharge examination was conducted. The report of this examination reveals no complaints or diagnosis of a back disorder. In November 1958, the veteran filed an application for compensation or pension, and no reference to a back disorder was noted on his application form. The report of a post service VA physical examination, performed in May 1959, notes the veteran's narrative history of injuring his left elbow and his right hand during service. No complaints relating to or findings noting the existence of a back disorder were indicated. The first post service medical evidence of record noting any complaint of or treatment for a back disorder is dated in 1993, 34 years after the veteran's discharge from the service. The veteran has failed to establish the required nexus between his current back disorder and his active duty military service. See Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 506, Dean v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 449, 455 (1995), Slater v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 240 (1996). During the course of this appeal, the veteran submitted statements alleging that his current back disorder is the result of injuries incurred during his active duty service. The statements given by the veteran are not competent evidence to establish the etiology of his current disorder. Medical diagnosis and causation involve questions that are beyond the range of common experience and common knowledge and require the special knowledge and experience of a trained physician. Because he does not have medical expertise, the veteran is not competent to make a determination that his current back disorder is the result of an inservice injury over three decades ago. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, at 495 (1992). In support of his claim, the veteran submitted an opinion letter, dated in September 1997, from M. Stelzer, M.D. In his letter, Dr. Stelzer noted that the veteran "reported to me that while in the air force [the veteran] was severely injured in 1958 in a tire explosion in which he literally bounced off of two walls." Based upon this account, Dr. Stelzer concluded that the veteran's "current condition, although not unique to severe physical trauma, is due in part to his earlier injury that occurred while in the air force in 1958. I believe that if [the veteran] had not suffered the above referenced injury in 1958 that it would be far less likely that he would suffer from his current condition for which he is receiving treatment today." The probative value of a medical opinion is generally based on the scope of the examination or review, as well as the relative merits of the expert's qualifications and analytical findings. See Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467 (1993). Its weight may be less if the examiner fails to explain the basis for an opinion, or treated the veteran briefly or for unrelated conditions. See Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). In LeShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406 (1995), the Court stated that evidence which is simply information recorded by a medical examiner, enhanced by any additional medical comment by that examiner, does not constitute "competent medical evidence." See also Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995) ("Bare transcription of a lay history is not transformed into 'competent medical evidence' merely because the transcriber happens to be a medical professional."). The Board finds that Dr. Stelzer's opinion fails to take into account the complete facts of record. In fact, the opinion offered by Dr. Stelzer appears to rely solely upon the veteran's own oral history of an inservice back injury occurring over three decades ago. There is no indication that Dr. Stelzer had reviewed or considered any objective evidence of the veteran's inservice or post service medical treatment. Moreover, a statement submitted by the veteran, received in February 1999, noted that he told Dr. Stelzer that he "had never been injured except for my accident while in the U.S.A.F." However, a treatment report, dated November 1993, notes the veteran's prior history of injuries, including having "fell off horse" and treatment for a post service gunshot wound in the left chest and arm in 1961. Based upon the failure of this opinion to take into account the complete facts of record, and the absence of any clinical data or other rationale to support its finding, the Board concludes that this opinion is not persuasive evidence linking the veteran's current back disorder to his inservice injury in January 1958. See Bloom v. West 12 Vet. App. 185 (1999); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim for service connection for residuals of a back injury. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). Because the evidence is not evenly balanced, the rule affording the veteran the benefit of the doubt does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1999); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 55. B. Headaches In this case, the veteran contends that he currently has a headache disorder as a result of an inservice injury in January 1958. The determinative issues presented by the claim are: (1) whether the veteran incurred or aggravated a chronic headache disorder during service; (2) whether he has a current disability; and, if so, (3) whether the current disability is etiologically related to his active duty service. The Board concludes that medical evidence is needed to lend plausible support for all of the issues presented by this case because they involve questions of medical fact requiring medical knowledge or training for their resolution. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. at 506; see also Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992). After a thorough review of the veteran's claims file, the Board concludes that the medical evidence of record does not show that the veteran incurred a chronic headache disorder during service. A review of the veteran's service medical records revealed a single complaint of headaches in September 1957, which was prior to the inservice tire explosion occurring in January 1958. Thereafter, the veteran's service medical records are silent as to treatment for headaches. The veteran's discharge examination, performed in November 1958, revealed no complaints or diagnosis of a headache disorder. The veteran's application for compensation or pension, received in November 1958, contained no reference to a headaches. The report of a post service VA general physical examination, performed in May 1959, also contained no complaints relating to or findings noting the existence of a headache disorder during service. The first post service medical evidence of record noting any complaint of or treatment for a headache disorder is dated March 1993, 34 years after the veteran's discharge from the service. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the evidence of record does not show a chronic headache disorder having been incurred during the veteran's active duty service. The veteran has also failed to establish the required nexus between his current headache disorder and his active duty military service. See Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 506, Dean v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 449, 455 (1995), Slater v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 240 (1996). The veteran's sworn testimony and other statements are not competent evidence to establish the etiology of his current disorder. Medical diagnosis and causation involve questions that are beyond the range of common experience and common knowledge and require the special knowledge and experience of a trained physician. Without medical expertise, the veteran is not competent to make a determination that this condition over three decades ago. See Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 495; Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. at 93. The Board also finds that, based on the failure of Dr. Stelzer's opinion of September 1997 to take into account the complete facts of record and the absence of any clinical data or other rationale to support his opinion, his opinion is not persuasive evidence linking the veteran's current headaches to his inservice injury in January 1958. See Bloom v. West 12 Vet. App. 185 (1999); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim for service connection for a chronic headache disorder. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1999). Because the evidence is not evenly balanced, the rule affording the veteran the benefit of the doubt does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1999); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 55. In reaching this decision, the Board acknowledges that it is possible that additional evidence may exist which could be helpful to the veteran's claim. Following the Board's remand herein, the RO requested information and releases from the veteran concerning any treatment he has received since his discharge from the service for a back or headache disorder. Although given 60 days to complete this task, no forms were forthcoming. Rather, it appears that the veteran chose to obtain this medical evidence on his own. In November 1998, the RO issued a Supplemental Statement of the Case reminding the veteran and his representative that "no reply to this request for evidence has been received by our office. It should be noted that the veteran attempted to obtain medical evidence on his own and did not receive a reply to several requests." Thereafter, the veteran submitted two release forms, VA Form 21-4142, and the RO obtained those records referred to therein. "[T]he duty to assist is not always a one-way street. If a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence." Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Under the circumstances presented in this case, the Board concludes that the duty to assist the veteran had been fulfilled. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a back injury disease is denied. Entitlement to service connection for headaches is denied. BETTINA S. CALLAWAY Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals