BVA9505163 DOCKET NO. 93-12 123 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in White River Junction, Vermont THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Siegel, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran was in service from September 1965 to January 1970. He has been credited with approximately two years and eight months of active service. This appeal arises from a rating decision of September 1992 from the White River Junction, Vermont, Regional Office (RO), in which it was determined that, while new and material evidence had been submitted to reopen a rating decision of January 1986 denying service connection for a psychiatric disorder and from which the veteran did not appeal, service connection for a nervous disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder, remained denied. In developing his current claim, the veteran his specifically identified the issue on appeal as entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder; accordingly, this decision pertains solely to that question. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL The veteran contends, in essence, that the RO erred when it denied service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. He specifically alleges that his experiences aboard a ship in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War were sufficiently traumatic and stressful as to result in post-traumatic stress disorder. He also alleges that his experiences while incarcerated in the brig were stressful. DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is the decision of the Board that the preponderance of the evidence is against his claim for service connection for post- traumatic stress disorder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the veteran's claim has been developed. 2. The presence of stressors that could be productive of post- traumatic stress disorder is not shown. CONCLUSION OF LAW Post-traumatic stress disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by wartime service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1994). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Board finds that the veteran's claim is "well grounded" within the meaning of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); that is, he has presented a claim that is plausible. He has not asserted that any records of probative value that may be obtained and which have not already been associated with his claims folder are available. It is accordingly found that all relevant facts have been properly developed, and that the duty to assist him, mandated by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991), has been satisfied. The veteran contends that he has post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his active service, and that service connection is warranted therefor. After a review of the record, however, the Board finds that his contentions are not supported by the evidence, and that his claim fails. In an April 1981 VA hospital summary, post-traumatic syndrome - delayed was noted. However, in the body of the report it was noted that the veteran was probably suffering from PTSD and that there was "likely" post-traumatic stress disorder. The examination report did not definitively identify the stressor or lay the foundation to support the likely diagnosis. In fact, it was noted that further investigation was warranted and the veteran was transferred to another VA facility for such investigation. The veteran was rehospitalized from April 23, to June 8, 1981. The diagnosis was changed to general anxiety disorder, and it was noted that his major problems were not directly related his Vietnam problems. Post-traumatic stress disorder was not diagnosed. The report covering the period from April to June 1981 is more probative than the report covering the period from April 15, to April 23, 1981. The former report merely noted that there was a likely problem and that further investigation at another facility was warranted. That other facility, after investigation, determined that the veteran's psychiatric disorder was not due to Vietnam, and PTSD was not diagnosed. The former report did not clearly identify the stressors, thus diminishing the probative value of the equivocal document. Furthermore, when one facility defers to another facility for investigation, the results of the investigating facility are of greater probative value. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to refer the appellant for further investigation. In addition, the latter facility had more time to evaluate and personally observe the appellant, thereby providing an opportunity to enter a better informed determination. See Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 467, 471 (1993). In an April 1992 VA progress note it was reported that the diagnoses included PTSD. However, neither the stressors nor the hallmark manifestations of PTSD were reported. Although the progress note tends to establish a well-grounded claim, the document is of little probative value because it does not provide an opportunity to explore the basis of the opinion. See Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990); Cross v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 150, 153 (1992). A summary of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitalization, dated in November 1992, indicates diagnoses to include post- traumatic stress disorder. However, the report of a VA psychiatric evaluation dated in December 1992 does not show that such disability was discerned on examination, and indicates remarks by the examining physician that the veteran "is claiming [post-traumatic stress disorder] as a disability, but it is not apparent to me in this interview that he suffers from that." For the purpose of establishing service connection for post- traumatic stress disorder, the contradictory record as to whether that disability is or is not currently manifested is only partly relevant, inasmuch as the record clearly demonstrates that the veteran did not undergo stressors or experience stressful events that would be productive of post-traumatic stress disorder. In support of his claim, he alleges that the stressors to which he was exposed included being on the "island" of a ship in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War when a plane returning to the ship dropped a bomb that rolled along the deck without exploding, and being in the supply hold of the ship during a general quarters drill. He also alleges that he was beaten and "mentally tortured" while being held in the brig after an "unauthorized absence." The Board is of the opinion that the events cited by the veteran as stressors are not of such a nature as to be productive of post-traumatic stress disorder. The on-board incidents cited by him are not shown to have been outside the range of human experience as constituted by military service; to the contrary, the shipboard events to which he has referred--an incoming plane dropping a bomb, and a general quarters alert--are typical of service in the armed forces. The report of the December 1992 VA psychiatric evaluation includes remarks by the examiner to the effect that "the stressors which [the veteran] describes do not appear to meet the criteria" for post-traumatic stress disorder. We also note that the veteran testified that the bomb could not go off and there was no indication that he was in danger of being struck by fragments (because it could not explode) or the weight of the bomb because he was not on the flight deck. In regard to being below deck during a general quarters alert, that is a frequent event that is clearly within the range of usual human (Navy) experience. The veteran reported, to Pathways of Rutland, Inc., that he was personally involved in shore bombardment and felt guilty about the villages that he felt responsible for having destroyed. However, the veteran did not indicate how he could have been personally involved in shore bombardment aboard a carrier. The veteran then reported to the same examiner that he was not involved in actual combat. The veteran also reported other inconsistent statements. He indicated that it was stressful not participating in combat, but that he went AWOL because of the military action in Vietnam. The veteran indicated that had seen a man lose his legs when an aircraft arrest cable had snapped. However, during his testimony, the incident changed to a cable snapping on the hanger deck when the ship was tied to another ship. Regardless of the inconsistencies, the detailed December 1992 VA examination did not result in a diagnosis of PTSD. With regard to the veteran's allegations that he was mentally and physically abused while in the brig, the Board finds that the events to which he has referred, even if such events did occur as he has described them, are not unexpected or outside the range of human experience for a person who is incarcerated. While the Board recognizes that a member of the armed forces who is incarcerated in the brig is probably subjected to stressful situations, the Board does not find that the situations cited by the veteran in this instance with regard to his inservice incarceration are of such a nature as to result in post-traumatic stress disorder. In brief, the Board finds that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the stressors that would be productive of such a disability have not been shown as having occurred. Although the veteran indicated that he was personally involved in the bombardment and destruction of villages, he testified that his duty was to type documents (rather than engage in combat) and informed an examiner that he did not participate in combat. The veteran also reported that he felt guilty because he did not do enough (participate in combat) but was AWOL because of the actions of the United States in Vietnam. Clearly, the veteran is not consistent in reporting his history. Accordingly, he is an unreliable historian and medical opinions based upon such unreliable history are equally unreliable. We also note that the veteran reported, in December 1992, that his job was not dangerous and did not bother him at the time. Therefore, the examiner noted that it was unclear whether the "distressing recollections would qualify as contributing to PTSD since they were not recollections of events that were stressors beyond the range of usual human experience." When all the evidence is assembled, the Secretary, is then responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 55 (1990). The Board concludes that the December 1992 report is the most detailed document in the record and establishes an opportunity to explore the reasons for the examiner's opinions. Regardless of the conflicting statements of the appellant, the VA examiner has determined and supported his opinion that the veteran did not experience events that were outside the range of usual human experience that would be marked distressing to almost anyone. Because the veteran has indicated that he did not engage in combat, there is no duty to attempt to verify something that did not happen or accept a diagnosis that is premised on an event that did not occur. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994). In the absence of credible evidence demonstrating the presence of stressors of such a nature as to be productive of post-traumatic stress disorder, the Board must accordingly conclude that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim for service connection for that disability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991). ORDER Service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder is denied. H. N. SCHWARTZ Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, ___ (1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991), a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402 (1988). The date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.