BVA9507673 
DOCKET NO.  91-12 875     )       DATE
          )
          )

On appeal from the decision of the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Fort Harrison,
Montana

THE ISSUE

Entitlement to waiver of recovery of loan guaranty indebtedness.

WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL

Appellant

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

J.W. Engle, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The appellant served on active duty from December 1941 to June
1945.

In April 1993 the Board of Veterans' Appeals (the Board) denied
entitlement to waiver of recovery of loan guaranty indebtedness
on appeal from a decision in October 1989 by the Committee on
Waivers and Compromises of the Ft. Harrison, Montana, Department
of Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO).  The veteran appealed
to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court). In
December 1994 the Court rendered a Memorandum Decision which
vacated the Board's April 1993 decision and remanded the issue to
the Board for further proceedings consistent with that decision.
[citation redacted].

REMAND

In the December 1994 Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that
the Board neglected to address a factor raised by the facts of
record in determining whether denying the waiver resulted in a
"fair decision between the obligor and the Government."
Specifically, that the appellant argued his mortgage default was
caused by his fluctuating income which was caused by the
government.  The appellant stated that the Crow Tribe failed to
pay him because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) wrongfully
refused to release tribal funds for the tribe's administration,
and such funds would have been used to pay his back pay.  The
Court indicated that the Board's decision did not reflect whether
it considered this allegation in determining whether the decision
not to waive the indebtedness would result in a fair decision
under the "equity and good conscience" standard.  38 C.F.R.
§ 1.965(a) (1994).

In view of the above, and the lack of objective evidence within
the record to adequately address the Court's concern regarding
whether BIA wrongfully refused to release tribal funds which
would have been applied to pay the appellant, and whether this
withholding was the reason for the default, the Board concludes
that additional development is necessary so that the Board may
provide a complete analysis of the regulatory factors, and
sufficient "reasons and bases" for our conclusions.

Accordingly, pursuant to direction of the Court, this case is
REMANDED for the following action:

1.  VARO should contact BIA and the Crow
Tribe and attempt to verify whether or not
funds were withheld from the Crow Tribe
which would have been used to pay the
appellant his salary during 1987 and 1988.

2.  The appellant should be requested to
identify and document what amount was due
and owing from BIA and how the failure to
receive that amount in light of the 1988
IRS tax return reflecting an income of
$68,172.00 prevented him from making his
monthly mortgage payment.

3.  The appellant should be requested to
submit an updated VA Form 4-5655 Financial
Status Report.

If the claim remains denied, the case should be returned to the
Board after compliance with all requisite appellate procedure.
The Board intimates no opinion as to the ultimate conclusion
warranted, pending completion of the requested development.  No
action is necessary on the appellant's part until he receives
further notice.  The purpose of this remand is to comply with an
Order of the Court.

          KENNETH R. ANDREWS, JR.
          Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals

The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, ___
(1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be
assigned to an individual member of the Board for a
determination.  This proceeding has been assigned to an
individual member of the Board.

Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 1991), only a decision of the
Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States
Court of Veterans Appeals.  This remand is in the nature of a
preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board
on the merits of your appeal.  38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1994).